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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Disputes over virtual world items, such as virtual money, Second 
Life islands, and even “sex beds,” can inform property law generally. 
Rights in these virtual world items, such as rights in software and many 
other intangible assets, are transferred by standard form agreements that 
are often designated as licenses. Other intangible assets,1 uch as 
internet domain names, are likewise transferred by standard form 
                                                                                                                     
 * Professor, Widener University School of Law. Many thanks to Greg Lastowka and 
John Rothchild, who gave helpful comments on a draft of this Article, and to the participants in 
the State of Play VI Conference at New York Law School, who asked many questions testing 
my ideas. Widener students Crystal Burkhart and Matthew Foreman provided wonderful 
research assistance.  
 1. In this Article, I use the term “intangible asset” to refer to all assets that cannot be 
transferred manually. See infra notes 15–17 and accompanying text.  
1
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agreements that convey ambiguous property rights. In this Article, I 
suggest that a study of virtual world assets and the agreements used in 
their transfer can help us to better understand property law as applied to 
intangible assets. This better understanding of property law can, in turn, 
assist us in interpreting the contracts that purport to define property 
rights in intangible assets.  
A virtual world is an online environment in which thousands of 
people can interact with one another on a persistent basis through their 
online personae known as avatars.2 For many readers of this Article, 
virtual worlds need no explanation; it has been hard to read a major 
newspaper in the past several years without encountering an article 
about them. For example, in the past several years, Second Life3 and 
other virtual worlds were featured in numerous articles in major 
American newspapers, including The New York Times,4 The 
Washington Post,5 and The Wall Street Journal.6 
Virtual worlds have captured the attention of legal and other 
scholars. The legal literature tends to focus on the application of “real 
world” laws to the virtual environment.7 Some have discussed how our 
                                                                                                                     
 2. EDWARD CASTRONOVA, SYNTHETIC WORLDS: THE BUSINESS AND CULTURE OF ONLINE 
GAMES 1 (University of Chicago Press 2005). 
 3. Second Life, http://secondlife.com (last visited Nov. 5, 2009). 
 4. Shira Boss, Even in a Virtual World, ‘Stuff’ Matters, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2007, at 3.1, 
available at 2007 WLNR 17584091; Sara Corbett, Portrait of an Artist as an Avatar, N.Y. 
TIMES MAG., Mar. 8, 2009, at 22; Katie Hafner, At Sundance, A Second Life Sweatshop is Art, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2008, at C5, available at 2008 WLNR 1658028; Stefanie Olsen, 
Storefronts in Virtual Worlds Bringing in Real Money, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2008, at B6, 
available at 2008 WLNR 23546553; Louise Story, Coke Promotes Itself in a New Virtual 
World, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2007, at C8, available at 2007 WLNR 24188664. 
 5. Daniel Greenberg, Hate Those Pesky Security Lines? Seeing the ‘World’ the Digital 
Way on Second Life, WASH. POST, Jan. 6, 2008, at P1; Robert O’Harrow Jr., Spies’ Battleground 
Turns Virtual: Intelligence Officials See 3-D Online Worlds as Havens for Criminals, WASH. 
POST, Feb. 6, 2008, at D1; Alan Sipress, Where Real Money Meets Virtual Reality, The Jury Is 
Still Out, WASH. POST, Dec. 26, 2006, at A1. 
 6. Alexandra Alter, My Virtual Summer Job, WALL ST. J., May 16, 2008, at W1; Anjali 
Athavaley, A Job Interview You Don’t Have to Show Up For: Microsoft, Verizon, Others Use 
Virtual Worlds to Recruit; Dressing Avatars for Success, WALL ST. J., June 20, 2007, at D1; 
Robin Sidel, Cheer Up, Ben: Your Economy Isn’t As Bad as This One—In the Make-Believe 
World Of ‘Second Life,’ Banks Are Really Collapsing, WALL ST. J., Jan. 23, 2008, at A1; Emily 
Steel, Avatars at the Office: More Companies Move Into Virtual World ‘Second Life’; Ugly 
Bosses Can Be Models, WALL ST. J., Nov. 13, 2006, at B1. 
 7. See generally Bryan T. Camp, The Play’s the Thing: A Theory of Taxing Virtual 
Worlds, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (2007) (discussing the application of the Internal Revenue Code to 
virtual world transactions); Leandra Lederman, “Stranger Than Fiction”: Taxing Virtual 
Worlds, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1620 (2007) (discussing the application of U.S. tax laws to 
transactions in both scripted and unscripted virtual worlds); Erez Reuveni, On Virtual Worlds: 
Copyright and Contract Law at the Dawn of the Virtual Age, 82 IND. L.J. 261 (2007) (arguing 
that copyright law should apply to virtual world creations).  
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property laws should apply in virtual worlds;8 others have questioned 
whether virtual worlds need their own governance institutions.9  
On the other hand, some scholars in disciplines other than law have 
sought to eradicate the distinction between the “real world” and the 
“virtual world.” Economist Edward Castronova labels virtual worlds 
“synthetic worlds,” which he defines as “crafted places inside 
computers that are designed to accommodate large numbers of 
people.”10 Rather than looking from the outside in to determine whether 
“real world” rules should apply in these synthetic worlds, Castronova 
argues that the true significance of synthetic worlds lies in the effects 
that “in world” activity will have on the outside, or “real” world.11 
Anthropologist Thomas Malaby goes a step further, eschewing the term 
“virtual” in favor of Castronova’s “synthetic” because the former term 
“founders on the very distinction that animates it: the real and the 
virtual.”12 
In this Article, I take another approach. Rather than asking whether 
real world laws can or should apply to virtual worlds, I discuss the ways 
in which the study of virtual worlds can contribute to real world law.13 
Specifically, I explain what the study of virtual world assets can do for 
property law. As I have discussed in previous articles, lawmaking 
institutions have difficulty properly classifying rights in intangible 
assets.14 Several years ago, Joshua Fairfield identified some significant 
characteristics of “virtual property,” explaining that such property can 
be experienced in ways that mimic the experiences that people have 
                                                                                                                     
 8. See generally Joshua A.T. Fairfield, Virtual Property, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1047 (2005) 
(proposing a theory of virtual property). 
 9. See generally Jack M. Balkin, Virtual Liberty: Freedom to Design and Freedom to 
Play in Virtual Worlds, 90 VA. L. REV. 2043 (2004) (arguing that legal regulation of virtual 
worlds is inevitable); F. Gregory Lastowka & Dan Hunter, The Laws of the Virtual Worlds, 92 
CAL. L. REV. 1 (2004) (arguing that virtual worlds are jurisdictions separate from tangible world 
jurisdictions). 
 10. CASTRONOVA, supra note 2, at 4.  
 11. CASTRONOVA, supra note 2, at 7. 
 12. Thomas Malaby, Parlaying Value: Capital in and Beyond Virtual Worlds, 1 GAMES &  
CULTURE 141, 144 (2006).  
 13. Two scholars have suggested that virtual worlds might provide a testing ground for 
legal rules and that this use of virtual worlds would be desirable because of the difficulty of 
testing legal rules in the field. Caroline Bradley & A. Michael Froomkin, Virtual Worlds, Real 
Rules, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 103, 104 (2004). 
 14. Juliet M. Moringiello, False Categories in Commercial Law: The (Ir)Relevance of 
(In)Tangibility, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 119, 119–20 (2007) [hereinafter Moringiello, False 
Categories]; Juliet M. Moringiello, Seizing Domain Names to Enforce Judgments: Looking 
Back to Look to the Future, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 95, 136–37 (2003) [hereinafter Moringiello, 
Seizing Domain Names]; Juliet M. Moringiello, Towards a System of Estates in Virtual 
Property, in CYBERLAW, SECURITY &  PRIVACY  399, 400 (Sylvia Mercado Kierkegaard ed., 
2007) [hereinafter Moringiello, Towards a System of Estates]. 
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with tangible assets.15 In this Article, I argue that because of these 
unique characteristics, virtual world assets can help us understand the 
nature of property rights generally and rights in intangible assets in 
particular.16 This understanding can help lawmaking institutions fashion 
better rules governing transfers of rights in intangible assets. In this 
Article, I use the term “intangible assets” to include all personal 
property that cannot be transferred manually, such as intellectual 
property, Internet domain names, and electronically-delivered software.  
In a previous article, I argued that “intangible” is not a significant 
property category for the purpose of creditors’ rights laws.17 In this 
Article, I expand my earlier analysis by arguing that virtual world assets 
graphically illustrate the different rights that persons can hold in an 
intangible asset. Once we see that intangible assets encompass the very 
same rights that are embodied in tangible assets, we can understand that 
the law should not permit the unfettered customization of property 
rights in intangible assets by standard form agreements, just as the law 
does not permit the unlimited customization of property rights in 
tangible assets and real property. My thesis is that a study of virtual 
world assets can help us understand why the numerus clausus principle 
should be more rigorously applied to rights in intangible assets and that 
the numerus clausus principle can, in turn, assist us in interpreting the 
standard form agreements that convey rights in intangible assets. 
To frame the discussions in this Article, I use two disputes involving 
Second Life assets, Bragg v. Linden Research18 and Eros, LLC v. 
Simon.19 Although both disputes ended in settlements,20 hey provide an 
excellent framework within which to discuss property rights. These 
cases illustrate that treating “virtual world assets” as a discrete and 
novel legal category is misleading, because the same property rights that 
                                                                                                                     
 15. Fairfield, supra note 8, at 1049–50. Fairfield uses the term “virtual property” to 
describe all intangible assets that are rivalrous and mimic tangible assets. Id. 
 16. At least one professor has used virtual worlds as a teaching tool in a first year Property 
class. See Elizabeth Townsend Gard & Rachel Goda, The Fizzy Experiment: Second Life, 
Virtual Property and a 1L Property Course, 24 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER &  HIGH TECH. L. J. 
915, 916–19 (2008). 
 17. Moringiello, False Categories, supra note 14, at 120. 
 18. Complaint, Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 593 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (No. 
06CV4925), available at http://www.lawy-ers.com/BraggvLinden_Complaint.pdf [hereinafter 
Bragg Complaint]. The complaint was originally filed in the Chester County, Pennsylvania 
Court of Common Pleas. 
 19. Complaint, Eros, LLC v. Simon, No. 1:07CV4447 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 2007), 
available at http://www.citmedialaw.org/sites/citmedialaw.org/files/2007-10-24-Eros%20 
Complaint.pdf [hereinafter Eros Complaint]. 
 20. There are several reports of the Bragg settlement. See, e.g., Second Life Lawsuit, Law 
Spot Virtual Worlds Law Library, http://www.lawspotonline.com/lawspot/vwlaw/liti/bragg.jsp. 
(last visited Nov. 5, 2009). For the Eros settlement, see Judgment by Consent as to Defendant 
Thomas Simon, Eros, No. 1:07CV4447 [hereinafter Eros Settlement]. 
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exist in tangible, or “real” world assets exist in virtual world assets. 
Because these cases involve two distinct property issues, they can also 
illustrate why a study of virtual worlds can help us better understand 
property rights in intangible assets. 
In Part II, I briefly describe the disputes in Bragg and Eros. In Part 
III, I explain virtual worlds and then parse the Second Life Terms of 
Service to illustrate the ambiguous nature of the rights granted by 
virtual world operators to participants in those worlds. In Part IV, I 
explore a traditional property principle, the numerus clausus principle, 
and explain why that principle, which prescribes a standard set of 
property forms, is a particularly useful tool for defining rights in 
intangible assets. In Part V, I discuss the pervasiveness of licenses today 
as well as the attempts by legislatures and courts to reclassify 
ambiguous or novel property grants. I conclude that an understanding of 
intangible assets, aided by an appreciation of virtual world creations, 
will assist us in interpreting the ambiguous property grants that many 
licenses currently convey. 
II.   BRAGG AND EROS: DISPUTES IN VIRTUAL PROPERTY 
A.  Bragg v. Linden Research: Does Virtual Land Come in Fee 
Simple? 
Marc Bragg is a lawyer in West Chester, Pennsylvania.21 In late 
2005, he joined Second Life, the virtual world developed by Linden 
Research (Linden).22 In order to join Second Life, Bragg was required 
to signify his agreement to the Second Life Terms of Service by 
clicking an “I accept” icon.23 Bragg was an active participant in Second 
Life, and according to the complaint that he filed against Linden in the 
Chester County Court of Common Pleas in October 2006, he was 
interested in developing Second Life “real estate” because of his prior 
interest in land development.24 
Of course, land in Second Life is not land as we know it in the 
tangible world, but it looks and acts a lot like tangible world land. The 
parties in Bragg defined the asset known as virtual land very differently 
in their court filings.25 Bragg, relying on Linden’s public 
representations,26 conceded that the land was made up of Linden’s 
computer code, but claimed that he received “title and ownership rights 
                                                                                                                     
 21. Law Offices of Marc S. Bragg, http://www.chescolawyers.com (last visited Nov. 5, 
2009).  
 22. Bragg Complaint, supra note 18, at 16. 
 23. Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 593, 603 (E.D. Pa. 2007). 
 24. Bragg Complaint, supra note 18, at 16. 
 25. Bragg Complaint, supra note 18, at 8–11, 15–16. 
 26. On the Second Life website, Linden tells members that they can “own” land. See infra 
notes 102–06 and accompanying text. 
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in that property separate and apart from the code itself.”27 His complaint 
further distinguished the property right from its material manifestation 
by claiming that members’ valuables in Second Life are “stored as 
electromagnetic records” on Linden’s servers.28  
On the other hand, in its answer, Linden focused on the material 
making up the land.29 Linden denied conveying title to anything, instead 
describing its grant to Bragg as “a license to access Linden’s proprietary 
server software, storage space, and computational power that enabled 
the experience of the ‘virtual land’ in Second Life.”30 
There are several ways to acquire land in Second Life; the method at 
issue in Bragg was the auction.31 Linden periodically creates new 
parcels of this land and auctions them to Second Life members.32 B agg 
acquired numerous parcels of land—the list of parcels attached to his 
complaint is three and one-half pages long.33 
To buy land and other items in Second Life, Bragg acquired 
Lindens, Second Life’s currency. Bragg purchased his Second Life’s 
currency with U.S. dollars. Second Life members can maintain in-world 
accounts of their money and before the events that precipitated Bragg’s 
lawsuit, his in-world Linden account held the equivalent of 2000 U.S. 
dollars.34 
Bragg bought one of his parcels, Taessot, by taking advantage of an 
exploit in the Second Life system that allowed him to acquire the parcel 
cheaply.35 He did so by obtaining access, without authorization, to a 
page on the Second Life auction website that enabled him to purchase 
land not yet released for auction.36 This act violated the Second Life 
Terms of Service.37 Because of this breach of contract, Linden froze 
Bragg’s account and removed Bragg’s name from all of the virtual land 
that he had acquired, thereby depriving Bragg of his Lindens and all of 
his land.38 Linden later sold this land to other Second Life members. 
Bragg’s complaint against Linden alleged several causes of action.39 
                                                                                                                     
 27. Bragg Complaint, supra note 18, at 2. 
 28. Bragg Complaint, supra note 18, at 13. 
 29. Defendants Linden Research, Inc. and  Philip Rosedale’s Answer to Complaint and 
Linden Research, Inc.’s Counterclaims Against Plaintiff Marc Bragg at 15, Bragg, 487 F. Supp. 
2d 593 (No. 06CV4925) [hereinafter Linden Answer]. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Bragg Complaint, supra note 18. I explain the other methods in the next Part of this 
Article. See infra Part III. 
 32. Second Life, Purchasing Land, http://secondlife.com/land/purchasing.php (last visited 
Nov. 5, 2009).  
 33. Bragg Complaint, supra note 18, at Exhibit 1. 
 34. Bragg Complaint, supra note 18, at 22. 
 35. Linden Answer, supra note 29, at 20. 
 36. Linden Answer, supra note 29, at 20. 
 37. Bragg, 487 F. Supp. 2d at 597. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Bragg Complaint, supra note 18, at 33–39. 
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Most importantly for this Article, Bragg claimed that Linden converted 
his property.40 Conversion is defined in the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts as “an intentional exercise of dominion or control over a chattel 
which so seriously interferes with the right of another to control it that 
the actor may justly be required to pay the other the full value of the 
chattel.”41 In order to hold Linden liable for conversion, a court would 
have to find that Bragg had property rights in these Second Life assets.42  
In October 2007, the parties in Bragg settled their dispute.43 There 
was one published opinion in the case, in which the court held that one 
provision in the Terms of Service, the arbitration clause, was 
unconscionable.44 The court never had the chance to analyze the rights 
granted to Bragg by the Terms of Service.45  
B.  Eros, LLC v. Simon: An Intellectual Property Dispute 
The plaintiffs in Eros, LLC v. Simon are described in the complaint 
as some of the most successful merchants in Second Life.46 K vin 
Alderman, the principal of the lead plaintiff, Eros, built the first in-
world sex bed47 and sells a host of adult-themed items.48 The other 
plaintiffs sell items such as virtual clothing,49 virtual furniture,50 and 
avatar skins.51 According to the complaint, the items sold by the 
plaintiffs are protected by trademark and copyright laws.52 
Defendant, Thomas Simon, was a Second Life entrepreneur of a 
different sort. Rather than develop the animation programs, clothing, 
                                                                                                                     
 40. Bragg Complaint, supra note 18, at 39–40. 
 41. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 222A (1965). 
 42. See Kremen v. Cohen, 337 F.3d 1024, 1029 (9th Cir. 2003) (addressing the conversion 
of a an Internet domain name, the court noted that “[t]he preliminary question, . . . is whether 
registrants have property rights in their domain names”). 
 43. See Second Life Lawsuit, supra note 20. 
 44. Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 593, 605–11 (E.D. Pa. 2007). 
 45. Id. I explain the rights granted by the Terms of Service in Part III of this Article. Se  
infra Part III.B. 
 46. Eros Complaint, supra note 19, at 1. 
 47. Id. at 4. A “sex bed” is “a digital bed with built-in sex position animations.” Regina 
Lynn, Stroker Serpentine, Second Life’s Porn Mogul, Speaks, WIRED, Mar. 30, 2007, available 
at http.//www.wired.com/culture/lifestyle/commentary/sexdrive/2007/03/sex_drive0330. Stroker 
Serpentine is Kevin Alderman’s alter ego. Id.; see also Eros Complaint supra note 19, at 4. 
 48. Eros Complaint, supra note 19, at 4. 
 49. Plaintiffs DE Designs, Kasi Lewis, and Teasa Copprue are described in the complaint 
as the sellers of some of the best selling avatar clothing and shoes in Second Life. Eros 
Complaint, supra note 19, at 6, 9, 12. 
 50. According to the Eros Complaint, plaintiff Linda Baca has sold thousands of items of 
virtual furniture to Second Life members around the world. Eros Complaint, supra note 19, at 
7–8. 
 51. The Eros Complaint describes plaintiff Shannon Grei as the seller of some of the best-
selling avatar skin designs in Second Life. Eros Complaint, supra note 19, at 10–11. 
 52. Eros Complaint, supra note 19, 7–13. 
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furniture, and skins himself, he simply copied them and sold the copies 
to Second Life members.53 All of the objects that he copied were 
marked “no copy” or “no transfer.”54 These markings make copying 
theoretically impossible, but there are security flaws in Second Life that 
enable copying of such objects.55 Because he copied the items without 
the plaintiffs’ authorization, the plaintiffs sued him for, among other 
things, trademark and copyright infringement.56 Simon did not raise 
much of a defense; he was quoted in The New York Post as saying 
“[plaintiffs] can say whatever they want to say[.] It’s a video game.”57 
In January 2008, the court entered a judgment by consent against 
Simon.58 The judgment required him to pay the plaintiffs $525 in 
restitution and to make all of his Second Life transaction records 
available to the plaintiffs.59 
C.  Why Bragg and Eros Matter 
If someone takes my bicycle from me without my permission, there 
is no question that the taker has committed conversion. My bicycle is 
tangible and historically, only property that could be lost and found, i.e. 
tangible property, could be converted.60 Whether intangible assets such 
as domain names and electronic business records can be converted is a 
question that has vexed several courts in the last decade.61 In those 
cases, the courts have framed the issues before them broadly, asking 
whether intangible property can be converted.62 As I discussed in a 
previous article, classifying intangibles as a discrete category often 
leads to results of questionable value to the development of the law.63  
                                                                                                                     
 53. Eros Complaint, supra note 19, 7–13. 
 54. Benjamin Duranske, Six Major Second Life Content Creators Sue Alleged Copyright 
Infringer in NY Federal District Court, VIRTUALLY BLIND , Oct. 27, 2007, http://virtuallyblind.c 
om/2007/10/27/content-creators-sue-rase-kenzo/. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Eros Complaint, supra note 19, at 15–21. 
 57. Kathianne Boniello, Unreality Byte$, N.Y. POST, Oct. 28, 2007, at 9, available at 
2007 WLNR 21381896. 
 58. Eros Settlement, supra note 20, at 1. 
 59. Eros Settlement, supra note 20, at 1–2. 
 60. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 15, at 90 (5th ed. 1984).  
 61. See, e.g., Kremen v. Cohen, 337 F.3d 1024, 1030–34 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that a 
domain name could be converted because it was merged in a document, the domain name 
system); Thyroff v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 864 N.E.2d 1272, 1278 (N.Y. 2007) (holding that 
conversion applies to electronic business records because “it generally is not the physical nature 
of a document that determines its worth, it is the information memorialized in the document that 
has intrinsic value”).  
 62. Kremen, 337 F.3d at 1030–31; Thyroff, 864 N.E.2d at 1276. 
 63. See generally Moringiello, False Categories, supra note 14, at 120 (noting that 
“[c]lassifying property according to its tangibility or intangibility creates false categories [that] 
hinder the ability of commercial law to expand to adequately accommodate electronic assets.”). 
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Virtual world disputes give us a unique opportunity. Because virtual 
world property looks like tangible property (a virtual bicycle is 
represented in Second Life as a three-dimensional version of a bicycle), 
and behaves like tangible property (an avatar can ride a virtual bicycle, 
and if the avatar is doing so, no one else can ride the virtual bicycle),64 
virtual property might help us understand the nature of property rights 
in intangible assets in ways that disputes involving other intangible 
assets, such as domain names, cannot. The Bragg and Eros disputes 
illustrate why this is so. 
Clearly, in the Bragg v. Linden case, the defendant, Linden, 
interfered with the plaintiff’s right to use specific things. Those things, 
land and currency, happened to be intangible, yet they were also 
rivalrous. Marc Bragg had the right to exclude others from his virtual 
land,65 and he had control over his currency account in the same way as 
we have control over our bank accounts.66 The second case, Eros, LLC 
v. Simon, raises a different property issue, one of intellectual property 
rights.67 
Although cited as the first “formal . . . recognition of virtual property 
by a U.S. court,”68 Eros, LLC v. Simon seems to be a straightforward 
trademark and copyright infringement matter.69 Certainly the consent 
judgment recognizes that the plaintiffs had intellectual property rights 
that the defendant infringed, but it is not clear that it is significant that 
the rights were appurtenant to virtual world property. To be eligible for 
copyright protection, a work of authorship must be “fixed in any 
tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from 
which [it] can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, 
either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.”70 “Tangible,” for 
the purpose of the Copyright Act, does not mean only items in paper or 
sculptural form; it includes works fixed in magnetic form that can be 
                                                                                                                     
 64. Fairfield, supra note 8, at 1052–53.  
 65. See infra text accompanying notes 105–06. 
 66. See infra text accompanying note 115. 
 67. See generally Eros Complaint, supra note 19 (including intellectual property claims of 
violation of the Lanham Act and copyright infringement). 
 68. Benjamin Duranske, Second Life Content Creators’ Lawsuit Against Thomas Simon  
(aka Avatar “Rase Kenzo”) Settles; Signed Consent Judgment Filed [Updated], VIRTUALLY 
BLIND , Dec. 3, 2007, http://virtuallyblind.com/2007/12/03/kenzo-simon-settlement/. 
 69. It is important to note here that the trademark infringement in Eros involved the in-
world use of an in-world mark. An in-world use of a mark established outside of the virtual 
world, such as the use of Coca-Cola’s mark on an in-world item that is not only not Coke, but 
not even a drink, might raise different issues. Candidus Dougherty & Greg Lastowka, Virtu l
Trademarks, 24 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER &  HIGH TECH. L. J. 749, 772–76 (2008). 
 70. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006). “[C]opyright . . . vests initially in the author or authors 
of the work.” Id. § 201(a). 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER &  DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, 
§ 5.01 (2008) (“[T]he person claiming copyright must either himself be the author, or he must 
have succeeded to the rights of the author.”). 
9
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perceived only with a machine.71 Because the creators’ works (the sex 
beds and other virtual items) clearly are fixed in tangible form under 
this definition, (much in the same way as a law review article that exists 
only in the author’s computer) the classification of the items as “virtual” 
should have no significance.  
Linden purports to grant certain property rights in its Terms of 
Service. Marc Bragg certainly relied on this grant in his complaint,72 as 
did the Eros plaintiffs.73 It is unclear, however, why the Eros plaintiffs 
believed that they had to rely on such a grant to establish their property 
rights. They were clearly authors of creative (some might say very 
creative) works. The Copyright Act grants such persons their 
intellectual property rights in such creations.74 However, using the 
Terms of Service to define rights in Marc Bragg’s land may be justified; 
after all, people commonly transfer property, particularly land, subject 
to restrictions. Restrictions on the use of land, however, must take 
specified forms in order to bind persons other than the parties to the 
original conveyance.75 
All items, tangible and intangible, can embody many property rights. 
Using a bicycle again as an example, a Second Life member, Angie, 
might own a bicycle in Second Life. Angie is not very creative, so she 
bought the bicycle from the hypothetical vendor Second Life Cycles, 
which makes and markets the “SL Wheels” brand of bicycle. Angie, 
through her avatar, can ride the bicycle, and while she is doing so, no 
one else can ride the bicycle. If another person, Bill, takes the bicycle, 
Bill has taken an action similar to that of Linden in the Bragg case—he 
has deprived Angie of her rights to possess and use the bicycle.  
If Bill makes copies of the bicycle and sells those copies as SL 
Wheels bicycles, he violates the property rights of another entity, 
Second Life Cycles. The rights violated here, however, are analogous to 
those violated by the defendants in Eros—they are intellectual property 
rights. Intellectual property rights are often the subject of license 
agreements.76 A copyright owner, such as an author, may want to grant 
the right to distribute her work to another person. The license is a grant 
                                                                                                                     
 71. NIMMER &  NIMMER, supra note 70, § 2.03[B][1]. 
 72. Bragg Complaint, supra note 18, at 3. 
 73. Eros Complaint, supra note 19, at 4; see also Eric Sinrod, Perspective: When Virtual 
Legal Chickens Come Home to Roost, CNET NEWS.COM, Nov. 7, 2007, 
http://news.cnet.com/When-virtual-legal-chickens-come-home-to-roost/2010-1043_3-621725 
5.html (“Second Life residents are governed by terms of service which specifically allow users to 
retain all intellectual property rights [that] they create or own in Second Life.”). 
 74. 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2006). 
 75. WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK &  DALE A. WHITMAN , THE LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 8.14, 8.23 (3d 
ed. 2000). 
 76. For further discussion of the relationship between licensing and intellectual property 
rights, see infra notes 148–52 and accompanying text. 
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of permission to do something that would otherwise result in copyright 
infringement. Licenses, however, have become ubiquitous on the 
Internet, and these licenses bear little resemblance to traditional licenses 
of intellectual property rights. The Second Life Terms of Service are an 
example of this new breed of Internet licenses that grant property rights 
that bear little resemblance to known property rights.  
III.   WHAT IS VIRTUAL PROPERTY AND WHERE DOES IT COME FROM?  
A.  Scripted and Non-Scripted Worlds 
Discussions of property in virtual worlds inevitably generate one 
question: “Isn’t a virtual world just a game?” In some cases, the answer 
is yes. On the other hand, virtual worlds such as Second Life are not 
games at all; they are new means of interaction, much as the Internet 
itself was, not long ago, a new means of interaction. In this Part, I 
explain the differences between scripted worlds and non-scripted 
worlds, and then discuss portions of the Second Life Terms of Service 
in detail.  
The general definition of a virtual world is an online environment 
that is both persistent and dynamic.77 It is persistent because it does not 
cease to exist when the participant turns her computer off; it is dynamic 
because it is continuously changing.78 Within this definition are two 
separate categories of virtual worlds, scripted and non-scripted.79 
Games such as World of Warcraft80 and social worlds such as Club 
Penguin81 fall into the scripted category, while Second Life falls into the 
non-scripted world. A key difference between the two worlds is the 
members’ ability to create content. Participants in scripted worlds have 
no ability to create in-world items.82 In non-scripted worlds, however, 
content is generated and provided by members, who have essentially 
unfettered ability to create items using raw materials provided by the 
virtual world developer.83 
A participant in a scripted game world acquires in-world items by 
playing the game.84 A player advances by acquiring game objects.85 
                                                                                                                     
 77. F. Gregory Lastowka & Dan Hunter, Virtual Worlds: A Primer, in THE STATE OF 
PLAY : LAW, GAMES, AND V IRTUAL WORLDS 13, 15 (Jack M. Balkin & Beth Simone Noveck eds., 
New York University Press 2006) [hereinafter STATE OF PLAY ]. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. World of Warcraft, http://www.worldofwarcraft.com (last visited Nov. 5, 2009). 
 81. Club Penguin, http://www.clubpenguin.com (last visited Nov. 5, 2009). Club Penguin 
is a virtual world designed for children in which children interact through their penguin avatars. 
Club Penguin, Parent’s Guide, http://www.clubpenguin.com/parents/club_penguin_guide.htm# 
what (last visited Nov. 5, 2009). 
 82. Dougherty & Lastowka, supra note 69, at 760. 
 83. Id. at 769. 
 84. Cory Ondrejka, Escaping the Gilded Cage: User Created Content and Building the 
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These game objects grant powers to the player, and the player uses these 
powers to achieve higher status in the game.86 Designers of scripted 
games tend to eschew commodification of their games. One reason for 
their position is that the game designers have a great interest in the 
progression of the game. The gamers themselves have certain 
expectations as well; if a participant spends hundreds of hours achieving 
a top player level, that participant does not want someone who bought 
his status to surpass him in the game. Richard Bartle, a noted game 
designer, compared the commodification of online games to the ability 
of any individual to purchase the world high-jump record and be 
recognized as the best high jumper in the world.87 According to Bartle 
and other game designers, game operators should have the ability to 
terminate traded characters because traded characters interfere with the 
game’s ability to function as a game.88 
Because of this interest in the progression of the game, the terms of 
use for virtual worlds such as World of Warcraft forbid real-world 
trades of these assets.89 World of Warcraft’s Terms of Use make it clear 
that “[g]ame play is what World of Warcraft is all about.”90 In 
furtherance of that view, the terms forbid the trading of player accounts, 
and similarly state that players have no “right or title . . . to . . . the 
virtual goods or currency appearing or originating in the [g]ame.”91 All 
of the content is provided by the developer, and the Terms of Use 
employ language that clearly grant limited rights to make specified uses 
of that content. 
By contrast, in non-scripted worlds, participants design the content 
and dictate the progression of life in the world. A person who joins 
Second Life can acquire assets in several ways. For example, one may 
create them. Doing so is a complicated process, as Linden provides only 
the basic building units and textures.92 To build a house or any other 
item in Second Life requires both time and skill. As persons with these 
                                                                                                                     
Metaverse, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 81, 89 (2004). 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Richard A. Bartle, Virtual Worldliness, in STATE OF PLAY , supra note 77, at 31, 35–37. 
 88. Richard A. Bartle, Virtual Worldliness, in STATE OF PLAY , supra note 77, at 31, 35–37. 
 89. World of Warcraft, Terms of Use Agreement, ¶ 9.C, http://www.worldofwarcraft.com 
/legal/termsofuse.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2009). 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. ¶ 11. Notwithstanding these prohibitions, property won in World of Warcraft is 
routinely traded on other websites. See, e.g., Buy WoW Accounts, http://www.buywowaccounts 
.com/security.php/ (last visited Nov. 5, 2009) (promising that all accounts are “protected & 
guaranteed from being reclaimed or disabled”). There is also an emerging economy of “gold 
farmers” who employ individuals to play these games for hours on end in order to achieve and 
sell desirable status. Julian Dibbell, The Life of the Chinese Gold Farmer, N.Y. TIMES MAG., 
June 17, 2007, at 36, 38. 
 92. Ondrejka, supra note 84, at 92. 
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skills proliferate in Second Life, they establish retail outlets for their 
creations. A Second Life member without much time or skill can 
purchase the items she needs or wants for her Second Life existence 
from these in-world retailers. The plaintiffs in Eros are good examples 
of such virtual world entrepreneurs.93 The plaintiff in Bragg, on the 
other hand, purchased his Second Life items.94  
B.  The Second Life Terms of Service and www.secondlife.com: What 
Does a New Member Receive? 
Virtual world developers require prospective members to agree to 
online terms of service, also called end-user license agreements, which 
claim to define the members’ rights in their in-world assets. The terms 
of service tend to be “click-wrap” agreements to which the prospective 
member must assent by clicking an icon labeled “I agree” or something 
similar before proceeding with the membership process.95 The Second 
Life Terms of Service are typical of these agreements. When printed 
out, the Second Life Terms of Service consist of thirteen printed 
pages.96 A prospective member is not required to scroll through the 
agreement before clicking her assent, but she has the chance to view the 
agreement by clicking on a hyperlink. As I explain further in this Part, 
the Terms of Service describe the respective property rights of Linden 
and the members in fairly ambiguous terms which often contradict the 
representations that Linden makes about property rights in its public 
pronouncements and on its website.97  
Linden distinguished itself from other virtual world developers when 
it announced that members of Second Life would have property rights 
in their Second Life creations and acquisitions.98 In 2003, Linden 
announced “a significant breakthrough in digital property rights for its 
customers . . . . Second Life’s Terms of Service now recognize the 
ownership of in-world content by the subscribers who make it.”99 
Linden explains this property regime to prospective members (and 
anyone else who is interested) in plain English on the Second Life 
website.100 On the “Create Anything” page, Linden proclaims that “once 
                                                                                                                     
 93. See Eros Complaint, supra note 19, at 4. 
 94. Bragg Complaint, supra note 18, at 17, 19. 
 95. See Christina L. Kunz et al., Click-Through Agreements: Strategies for Avoiding 
Disputes on Validity of Assent, BUS. LAW., Nov. 2001, at 401, 401 (defining “click-wrap”). 
 96. Second Life, Terms of Service, http://secondlife.com/corporate/tos.php (last visited 
Nov. 5, 2009).  
 97. Id. 
 98. Press Release, Linden Lab, Second Life Residents to Own Digital Creations (Nov. 14, 
2003), available at http://lindenlab.com/pressroom/releases/03_11_14. 
 99. Id.  
 100. Second Life, Create Anything, http://secondlife.com/whatis/create.php (last visited 
Nov. 5, 2009). 
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you’ve built something, you can easily begin selling it to other 
residents, because you control the [intellectual property] [r]ights of your 
creations.”101 
A person who clicks the “Land” link at the top of Second Life home 
page is taken to a page that describes the types of land in Second 
Life.102 The land page contains several links, including those labeled 
“Buy Land,” “Land Rentals,” and “About Land.”103 An individual 
clicking the “About Land” icon is greeted with language that seems to 
grant the property rights in virtual land that one obtains upon the 
purchase of “real” land.104 Linden assures its members that “[o]wning 
land lets you control what happens on that land.”105 The page tells users 
that they have rights that we normally consider to be components of the 
property bundle of rights: the right to exclude (“[y]ou can prevent others 
from visiting or building . . . .”), and the right to alienate (“sell it[]”).106 
The website tells members that they can buy land three different ways: 
from residents who put their land up for sale, from Linden in auctions of 
newly created land, and from Linden if the buyer wants to purchase a 
larger private region (also known as an island).107 Private regions vary 
in cost, with the most expensive being “Full Regions” that can be used 
for any Second Life purpose and the least expensive being “Open Space 
Regions” that can be used for scenery.108  
While the Second Life website speaks of land ownership, the Terms 
of Service make no mention of ownership, nor do they mention land.109 
The greatest right that the Terms of Service appear to give users is a 
license right, but it is not even clear that they grant a license to use 
Second Life land. Second Life members are granted a license to “use 
the Linden Software and the rest of the Terms of Service.”110 The 
“service” is defined as the servers, software, application program 
interfaces, and websites.111 It is not clear that the land is part of the 
Service; two paragraphs later, the Terms of Service define the graphics 
as “Content.”112 Later, the Terms state that nothing in the Terms of 
                                                                                                                     
 101. Id.  
 102. Second Life, Buy Land, http://secondlife.com/land/ (last visited Nov. 5, 2009).  
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Second Life, Knowledge Base, https://support.secondlife.com/ics/support/kbAnswe 
r.asp?questionID=4058 (last visited Oct. 4, 2009). 
 106. Id. 
 107. Second Life, Purchasing Land, http://secondlife.com/land/purchasing.php (last visited 
Nov. 5, 2009). 
 108. Second Life, Private Region Pricing, http://secondlife.com/land/privatepricing.php 
(last visited Nov. 5, 2009). 
 109. Second Life, Terms of Service, supra note 96. 
 110. Second Life, Terms of Service, supra note 96, ¶ 3.1. 
 111. Second Life, Terms of Service, supra note 96, ¶ 1.1  
 112. Second Life, Terms of Service, supra note 96, ¶ 1.3. 
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Service or Linden’s websites grant any rights in any Content.113 When a 
Second Life member acquires land with the purpose of building 
something on it, clearly that member thinks that he is acquiring rights in 
something. The website indicates that the member is buying “land,” but 
the Terms of Service appear to grant nothing.114  
A member obtains this land by paying for it in Lindens, the Second 
Life currency that currently trades at 259 Lindens to the U.S. dollar.115 
The Terms of Service are clearer concerning members’ rights in 
Lindens, but here again the Terms of Service and the Second Life 
website send contradictory messages. Second Life hosts a currency 
exchange, the LindeX, through which members can trade Lindens.116 
The LindeX is a part of the Second Life website, and it describes 
transactions in Lindens as purchases and sales.117 The website describes 
the LindeX as “a Linden dollar exchange offering residents of Second 
Life the ability to either buy or sell Linden dollars.”118 A Second Life 
member makes these purchases in her local currency, and Linden 
enables transactions in currency other than U.S. dollars through the 
International Linden Dollar Marketplace.119 Linden does not agree to 
repurchase this currency when a participant wishes to leave Second 
Life; the participant must find a buyer for her virtual currency, which 
she can do through the LindeX.120 
Second Life’s Terms of Service tell the users something very 
different. First, despite the fact that the website tells members that they 
can buy virtual currency, the Terms of Service tell users that their right 
to use Lindens arises under a license to use an “in-world fictional 
currency.”121 Linden reserves the right to manage, regulate or eliminate 
the currency for any reason in its sole discretion.122 According to the 
Terms of Service, the LindeX is not a currency exchange, but rather an 
“aspect of the [Second Life] Service through which 
Linden . . . administers transactions among users for the purchase and 
sale of the licensed right to use Currency.”123  
                                                                                                                     
 113. Second Life, Terms of Service, supra note 96, ¶ 3.1. 
 114. Second Life, Terms of Service, supra note 96, ¶ 1.3. 
 115. Second Life, LindeX Exchange, http://www.secondlife.com/currency/market.php (last 
visited Nov. 5, 2009). 
 116. Second Life, LindeX Exchange: About the LindeX Exchange, http://secondlife.com/ 
currency (last visited Nov. 5, 2009). 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Second Life Wiki, L$ Marketplace, http://wiki.secondlife.com/wiki/L$_Marketplace 
(last visited Nov. 5, 2009).  
 120. Id. 
 121. Second Life, Terms of Service, supra note 96, ¶ 1.4. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. ¶ 1.5 (emphasis added). 
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A Second Life member purchases Lindens with U.S. dollars (or any 
other currency) and uses those Lindens to purchase in-world items. 
When the Second Life member tires of his Second Life existence, he 
can sell those Lindens to another member for U.S. dollars. Yet Linden 
insists, in its online Terms of Service, that the member’s rights in the 
Lindens are merely license rights.124  
In Second Life, not only can a member acquire land using Lindens, 
that person can also build on the land. Building is difficult—Linden 
provides some basic building blocks, colors and textures, but putting 
together a simulation of a building requires both time and skill. Linden 
has made many representations to the effect that users have property 
rights in the content that they create.125 The Terms of Service grant the 
users “copyright and other intellectual property rights” with respect to 
anything that they create in Second Life.126 In the next paragraph, 
however, Linden states that while a creator of content has intellectual 
property rights in that content, that person’s intellectual property rights 
give him no rights whatsoever in data stored on Linden’s servers, 
including “any data representing or embodying” any of the creator’s 
content.127  
C.  Issues Raised by the Second Life Terms of Service 
The Second Life Terms of Service, viewed in the context of the 
Bragg and Eros disputes, illuminate some significant issues that often 
arise in disputes involving intangible assets. In these disputes one party 
often argues that the extent of the asset holder’s property right is limited 
by the terms of the contract. A classic example of such an argument was 
that made by Network Solutions, Inc. (NSI) in Network Solutions, Inc. 
v. Umbro International Inc.,128 a dispute over a domain name. In that 
case, NSI argued that its contract with the domain name registrant was 
“the only source of rights . . . and that a registrant receives only the 
conditional contractual right to the exclusive association of the 
registered domain name with a given [Internet Protocol] number for a 
given period of time.”129  
                                                                                                                     
 124. Id. As I will discuss in the next Part, a license should not be a license merely because 
the person drafting the agreement labels it as such. See infra Part IV.  
 125. See supra text accompanying note 99. In addition, Linden’s Vice President of Product 
Development, Cory Ondrejka, has written an article to that effect. Ondrejka, supranote 84, at 95 
(“Rather than attempting to recreate intellectual property law, Second Life’s developers decided 
to allow real world laws to reach into the virtual world. In November 2003, Second Life’s terms 
of service were changed to allow users to retain real-world intellectual property rights to their 
virtual creations.”). 
 126. Second Life, Terms of Service, supra note 96, ¶ 3.2. 
 127. Second Life, Terms of Service, supra note 96, ¶ 3.3.  
 128. 529 S.E.2d 80 (Va. 2000). 
 129. Id. at 85 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
16
Florida Law Review, Vol. 62, Iss. 1 [], Art. 4
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol62/iss1/4
2010] VIRTUAL WORLDS 175 
 
Linden made a similar argument in the Bragg dispute.130 In its 
answer to Marc Bragg’s complaint, Linden argued that its contractual 
characterization of Bragg’s property rights should govern the 
relationship between Linden and Bragg with respect to the land.131 
Linden characterized Bragg’s rights in his Second Life land as “a 
license to computing resources.”132 Linden’s answer attempted to 
reconcile Linden’s public statements with the Second Life Terms of 
Service by describing the public representations that members would 
own title to their land as “metaphors or analogies to the concepts of 
ownership of real property.”133 Linden seemed to claim that the analogy 
to real property ownership could not possibly be determinative of a 
member’s right to Second Life land. “Ownership” may be a metaphor to 
Linden, but that metaphor might be determinative when one separates 
the property idea from the item at issue. Linden did more than use a 
metaphor in its public pronouncements; it set forth the important 
attributes of a member’s relationship to the bits that make up the 
member’s “land.” Title is an intangible concept. The components of title 
are likewise intangible, and are made up of relationships.134 If Linden 
concedes that members have these relationships with Linden and others 
with respect to items on Linden’s servers, then Linden is recognizing 
property rights. The property rights that the Terms of Service grant, 
however, bear little obvious resemblance to known property rights. 
The Second Life Terms of Service are rife with novel property 
forms. For instance, as explained above, Linden describes a 
participant’s right to his virtual money as a license to use a fictional 
currency.135 To determine the meaning of this grant, one has to define 
both “license” and “fictional currency.” The term license is often used 
                                                                                                                     
 130. Linden Answer, supra note 29, at 11. 
 131. Linden Answer, supra note 29, at 11. 
 132. Linden Answer, supra note 29, at 11. 
 133. Linden Answer, supra note 29, at 11. Here, Linden may have unwittingly stepped into 
a property theory debate. Many have written about the role of metaphor in property law. See 
generally Dan Hunter, Cyberspace as Place and the Tragedy of the Digital Anticommons, 91 
CAL. L. REV. 439 (2003) (discussing the pervasiveness of the “Cyberspace as Place” metaphor 
and power of metaphor to affect legal thinking and thus lawmaking); Eduardo M. Peñalver, 
Property Metaphors and Kelo v. New London: Two Views of the Castle, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2971, 2972 (2006) (noting that the “bundle of sticks metaphor continues to serve a useful 
function for lawyers trying to get their minds around the . . . property doctrine and, 
consequently, is not likely to disappear any time soon”). 
 134. See RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY 3 (1936) (“The word ‘property’ is used in this 
Restatement to denote legal relations between persons with respect to a thing.”); JOSEPH
WILLIAM SINGER, INTRODUCTION TO PROPERTY § 1.1.1 (2d ed. 2005) (“Property concerns 
relations among people, not relations between people and things . . . . [M]any property rights do 
not concern ‘things’ at all, but intangible resources, such as copyright or interests in an ongoing 
business.”). 
 135. See supra text accompanying notes 122–23. 
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today to describe a conveyance of rights in intangible assets,136 but the 
use of the term to describe rights in money is unusual. Perhaps, then, the 
fact that this currency is “fictional” makes the conveyance by license 
acceptable. But what is a fictional currency? The value of a U.S. dollar 
has no relation to the value of the paper on which it is printed. Money is 
based on trust; currency has value because people trust that it can be 
exchanged for items of value and for other currencies.137 In a sense, all 
money is virtual, as we commonly exchange not paper money, but 
credit card numbers and bank account numbers.138 Clearly the members 
of Second Life trust the Linden as a currency, as they spend Lindens to 
buy Second Life assets and accept them in exchange for those assets. 
Linden’s grant of intellectual property rights is also confusing. The 
creator of a sex bed or other Second Life content ought to have the 
intellectual property rights to her creation regardless of whether the 
Terms of Service grant such rights. Copyright law provides that 
copyright “vests initially in the author or authors of the work.”139 The 
ownership of a copyright and the ownership of the material object in 
which the copyrighted work is embodied are separate however,140 and if 
the Terms of Service grant only intellectual property rights, then it is not 
clear what someone who buys currency, land, or a sex bed receives. 
It is also unclear what creators like those in the Eros case convey. 
The Second Life website tells members and potential members that they 
can sell the items that they make, because they have the intellectual 
property rights in those creations.141 Certainly the creators of sex beds, 
avatar skins, and other virtual world items do not intend to transfer their 
intellectual property. They must, then, be selling something else, the 
material embodiment of the intellectual property. It is not clear that they 
can sell that material embodiment of the intellectual property, however. 
Linden claims that it licenses its textures and environmental content to 
its members.142 These textures and environmental content are the 
materials that creative members use to create the very assets that they 
are allowed to “sell” in Second Life. 
Today, the term license escapes a precise definition. In real property 
law, a license is a revocable permission to “use or enjoy” the licensor’s 
                                                                                                                     
 136. See infra text accompanying notes 148–50. 
 137. Malaby, supra note 12, at 152. Malaby also reminds us that the Euro was introduced 
“virtual[ly]” before any physical money was introduced, in order to test the new currency’s 
viability. Id. 
 138. WILLIAM GREIDER, SECRETS OF THE TEMPLE 229–30 (Simon & Schuster 1987) (“When 
money is no longer represented even by paper, it becomes a pure abstraction . . . .”). 
 139. 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2006). 
 140. Id. § 202.  
 141. Second Life, Create Anything, http://secondlife.com/whatis/create.php (last visited 
Nov. 5, 2009).  
 142. Second Life, Terms of Service, supra note 96, ¶ 3.4. 
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land and it does not grant a possessory interest.143 In the world of 
intellectual property, a license grants permission to use intellectual 
property in ways that would otherwise infringe the exclusive rights of 
the licensor.144 The rights granted by a license cannot be defined 
generally, because a license is a contract and courts tend to respect 
freedom of contract.145 The word “license” is never used to describe a 
grant of rights in an ordinary material object.146 Bicycle shops do not 
offer their customers a license to use a bicycle. In Second Life, on the 
other hand, it seems that the only rights that a purchaser of a virtual 
bicycle receives are license rights. 
Regardless of the definition of license, a license is recognized as a 
contract. When the right being transferred is copyright, this makes 
sense. Copyright is a set of exclusive rights granted to creators, and 
creators are entitled to dictate, for a limited time, the permissible uses of 
their creations, subject to the limitations of first sale and fair use.147 The 
plaintiffs in Eros could have been clever creators with no marketing 
skills. Therefore, after they created their sex beds, avatar skins and other 
useful Second Life items, they might have turned to someone more 
skilled in marketing to sell their items, thus giving the marketing expert 
a license to distribute their work.  
Virtual world terms of service are not unique in their attempt to 
define property rights in ways that do not comport with our common 
understanding of those rights. Several scholars have identified this 
problem as it applies to software, and have questioned the general 
acceptance of licensing as a method of transferring software copies.148 
This licensing practice was common even before software was routinely 
delivered electronically, as even software delivered on a tangible disk is 
often accompanied by terms stating that the disk is licensed, not sold.149 
Purchasers of Internet domain names also must enter into contracts with 
                                                                                                                     
 143. 4 RICHARD R. POWELL &  MICHAEL ALLAN WOLF, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 34.01, 
at 34–37 (2009). 
 144. 1 RAYMOND T. NIMMER, THE LAW OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY § 7.4 (3d ed. 1997).  
 145. RAYMOND T. NIMMER, LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND OTHER 
INFORMATION ASSETS 3 (2007). 
 146. John A. Rothchild, The Incredible Shrinking First-Sale Rule: Are Software Resale 
Limits Lawful?, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 33 (2004). 
 147. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–1332 (2006). 
 148. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property and Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 1239, 1239 (1995) (criticizing attempts by software vendors to “avoid the rules of 
intellectual property law entirely); Michael J. Madison, Reconstructing the Software License, 35 
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 275, 333–34 (2003) (questioning the legal support for the practice of software 
licensing); Glen O. Robinson, Personal Property Servitudes, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1449, 1473–78 
(2004) (examining the practice of software licensing and its acceptance by some courts); 
Rothchild, supra note 146, at 26–28 (discussing cases in which courts have accepted the 
arguments of software publishers that software copies are licensed, not sold). 
 149. Rothchild, supra note 146, at 4–5. 
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domain name registrars, and those contracts tend to prohibit forced 
transfers of the registered names to creditors,150 despite the fact that in a 
permitted voluntary transfer, a domain name can sell for a large amount 
of money.151 Should the law allow those who transfer intangible assets 
to define the extent of property rights in those assets without any 
limitation on the types of rights transferred? 
In order to reject licenses, and therefore freedom of contract, as the 
default mechanism for transferring intangibles, we need guidance in 
identifying the point at which freedom of contract ends and property 
right protection begins. As I discuss in the next Part, the numerus 
clausus principle provides such guidance.  
IV.   VIRTUAL PROPERTY AND THE NUMERUS CLAUSUS  
A.  Contract or Property?  
In the previous Part, I identified some of the aspects of the Second 
Life Terms of Service that obscure the property rights granted by those 
terms. Several scholars have identified the problem of allowing the 
contracts governing virtual worlds to define the boundaries of virtual 
world property rights. Greg Lastowka and Dan Hunter, in The Laws of 
the Virtual Worlds, predicted that “[w]e will likely see courts rejecting 
[Terms of Service] to the extent that they place excessive restrictions on 
the economic interests of users,” adding that “[a]s we live out more of 
our lives in these worlds, any simple resolution of the property rights 
issues will become more difficult.”152 Joshua Fairfield, in Virtual 
Property, questioned why we permit virtual world developers to 
“prevent formation of property rights in the first instance any more than 
we tolerate other consensual restraints on alienation.”153 As Fairfield 
correctly observed, our law does not normally permit customization of 
property rights outside of recognized forms.154 As illustrated in the 
previous Part, some terms of service not only customize property rights, 
but do so in an incomprehensible manner. In this Part, I discuss the 
numerus clausus principle, which limits property rights to a list of 
defined forms, and explain why the justifications for that principle apply 
with special force to disputes over intangible assets. 
To illustrate the problem of allowing those who create and convey 
                                                                                                                     
 150. See, e.g., Register.com, Master Services Agreement, ¶ 29, http://www.register.com/ 
policy/servicesagreement.rcmx#18 (last visited Nov. 5, 2009) (stating that any attempt by a 
creditor to obtain rights in a domain name “renders this Agreement voidable at our option”).  
 151. For instance, as of October 4, 2009, the domain name “models.net” was listed for sale 
at $195,000. Afternic Domain Listing Service, http://www.afternic.com/names.php?feat=1 (last 
visited Oct. 4, 2009). 
 152. Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 9, at 50–51. 
 153. Fairfield, supra note 8, at 1083–84. 
 154. Fairfield, supra note 8, at 1084. 
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intangible assets unfettered discretion to define and limit property rights 
in those assets, it is helpful to break down an asset transfer into three 
components: the asset, the property right in the asset, and the contract 
transferring the asset. Property rights in assets are often transferred by 
contract, and when a contract transfers rights in a tangible asset, it is 
easy to separate the three elements. Everyone can distinguish between a 
house and a contract to sell a house. Lawyers understand that when the 
house is sold, the contract transfers a property right, such as a fee 
simple, in that asset. The property right is itself intangible.  
When rights in intangible assets are transferred, however, we cannot 
visualize the asset and therefore we have difficulty separating the asset 
from both the property right and the contract transferring it. Courts have 
this problem as well. For example, in Network Solutions, Inc. v. Umbro 
International, Inc., a case in which a judgment creditor attempted to 
garnish Internet domain names to satisfy its judgment, the court 
characterized the names, which were generic and had great economic 
value, as “‘the product of a contract for services.’”155 As a result, the 
court held that the names were not the type of property that could be 
garnished.156 Umbro illustrates one reason why the distinction between 
contract and property is significant—under creditors’ rights laws only 
rights that are property can be seized or garnished.157 However, the 
Bragg dispute illustrates another reason: If Marc Bragg acquired 
property rights in his Second Life currency and land, then Linden 
Research likely committed conversion when it denied him access to his 
account. In both the Bragg and Eros disputes, the plaintiffs were 
deprived of assets that undoubtedly had value. Property casebooks are 
filled with cases in which a party who seeks something of value asks the 
court to find that he or she has a property right in that thing of value.158 
The distinction between contract and property is ordinarily not 
relevant to a dispute between the parties to the conveyance. If I buy a 
house and promise my seller that I will not paint it orange, my seller 
                                                                                                                     
 155. 529 S.E.2d 80, at 81 (quoting Dorer v. Arel, 60 F. Supp. 2d 558, 561 (E.D. Va. 
1999)). I discuss this case in more detail in Moringiello, Seizing Domain Names, upra note 14, 
at 103–10 (discussing judicial treatment of domain names). 
 156. Umbro, 529 S.E.2d at 86. 
 157. In addition, creditors can only create rights against property of their debtors. See 
U.C.C. § 9-203(b)(2) (2005) (stating that a security interest cannot be enforceable unless the 
debtor has “rights in the collateral[]”). Collateral is a defined term in Article 9, and means “the 
property subject to a security interest.” Id. § 9-102 (a)(12) (emphasis added). 
 158. See, e.g., Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 481–82 & n.4 (Cal. 
1990) (stating how a plaintiff sued for conversion of cells used in medical research without his 
permission); In re Marriage of Graham, 574 P.2d 75, 75 (Colo. 1978) (addressing whether the 
monetary value of a professional degree could be divided as marital property in a divorce 
proceeding).  
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should be able to enforce that promise against me.159 There are few 
limits on the types of contract promises that the law will enforce 
because contracts create in personam rights which bind only the parties 
to the contract.160 Some promises are unenforceable as a matter of 
public policy,161 and courts may refuse to enforce some contract terms 
on unconscionability grounds.162 But beyond these limitations, contract 
rights are infinitely customizable.163 A person who has agreed to 
contract terms should not later have the ability to say that she should not 
be bound by those terms. Because contract rights bind only the parties 
to the contract, who presumably have agreed to the scope of those 
rights, this view comports with the policy of freedom of contract.  
The difference between contract and property is relevant, however, 
to parties who have not agreed to the scope of the right. A third-party 
who wants to or is forced to deal in some way with the right in question, 
such as by purchasing it, lending against it, or enforcing rights in it, 
must learn both the extent of the right and the identity of the holders of 
that right.164 Therefore, it is often said that the main difference between 
a contract right and a property right is the extent to which the right 
binds persons other than the parties to the contract conveying the right. 
As a result, the law will enforce my promise not to paint the house 
orange against subsequent owners of the house only if my promise takes 
a prescribed form.165 Because the classic in rem, or property, right is 
enforceable against the entire world, property scholars agree that there 
must be some method of publicizing such rights.166 One way to do so is 
to record the interest in an established recording system.167 Another is 
the standardization of property forms provided by the numerus clausus 
principle.168  
                                                                                                                     
 159. See SINGER, supra note 134, § 6.1, at 231 (“When a dispute arises between the original 
covenanting parties, it is governed by general rules of contract.”). 
 160. See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101 
COLUM. L. REV. 773, 776–77 (2001). 
 161. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178 (1981). 
 162. Id. § 208. 
 163. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Property, Contract and Verification: The 
Numerus Clausus Problem and the Divisibility of Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S373, S373 (2002); 
Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The 
Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 3 (2000). 
 164. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 163, at S382–83. 
 165. See SINGER, supra note 134, § 6.2 (describing the formalities that must be satisfied in 
order for a servitude to run with the land). 
 166. See Richard A. Epstein, Notice and Freedom of Contract in the Law of Servitudes, 55 
S. CAL. L. REV. 1353, 1357 (1982). 
 167. Id. at 1358. Discussing servitudes, Epstein argued that, because interests in land are 
recorded, freedom of contract should prevail in the area of servitudes. Id. 
 168. Merrill & Smith, supra note 163, at 776–77.  
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B.  The Numerus Clausus and its Justifications 
Numerus clausus means “the number is closed.”169 The principle 
operates to prevent courts from recognizing property interests outside of 
a closed set.170 As a result, property law limits the types of property 
interests that can be created and transferred.171 When parties attempt to 
customize property interests in a way that lies outside this closed set, the 
court will determine which of the recognized types of property forms 
best fits the interest that the parties created.172 Civil law countries apply 
the numerus clausus explicitly; in common law countries, its application 
is more implicit, and it is reflected in American law without explicit 
mention.173  
The numerus clausus i  an important interpretation tool. To give two 
textbook examples, a landlord might try to convey property to a tenant 
“for the duration of the war” only to see a court transform the tenancy 
into one for a term of years.174 Likewise, a will that granted a house to a 
beneficiary “to live in and not to be sold” was construed to convey a fee 
simple interest without a restraint on alienation.175 In the former case, 
the grant resembles a known partial interest, a leasehold, while the latter 
grant is closer to a fee simple interest than to any recognized partial 
interest.  
In the past decade, a handful of scholars have written extensively on 
the numerus clausus.176 While these scholars formulate their 
justifications for a closed set of property rights differently, one 
conclusion in numerus clausus scholarship is that this closed set 
provides a necessary shorthand so that people other than the parties to 
the contract conveying the right will know both the extent of the right 
                                                                                                                     
 169. Stephen R. Munzer, The Commons and the Anticommons in the Law and Theory of 
Property, in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 148, 156–
57 (Martin P. Golding & William A. Edmundson eds., 2005); Merrill & Smith, supra note 163, 
at 4. 
 170. THOMAS W. MERRILL &  HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 579 
(2007). 
 171. Id.  
 172. Merrill & Smith, supra note 163, at 11.  
 173. MERRILL &  SMITH, supra note 170, at 579; see also Merrill & Smith, supra note 163, 
at 4, 10–11 (explaining that the numerus clausus principle is explicitly recognized in civil law 
jurisdictions and is applied, without specific mention, by American courts). American statutory 
law also reflects the numerus clausus. See U.C.C. § 1-203 (2005) (providing rules for 
distinguishing leases from secured sales). 
 174. Merrill & Smith, supra note 163, at 11. 
 175. White v. Brown, 559 S.W.2d 938, 940–41 (Tenn. 1977) (Cooper, J., and Fones, J., 
concurring, joined by Harbison, J., and Henry, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted).  
 176. See, e.g., Nestor M. Davidson, Standardization and Pluralism in Property Law, 61 
VAND. L. REV. 1597, 1598 (2008); Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 163, at S374; Merrill & 
Smith, supra note 163, at 11; Merrill & Smith, supra note 160, at 778; Francesco Parisi, Entropy 
in Property, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 595, 625 (2002). 
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and the identity of the persons entitled to convey the right.177 The 
numerus clausus principle functions as a notice mechanism in that it 
tells people transacting in or interacting with property that the property 
interest can take one of a limited number of defined forms. Below, I 
summarize some of the work by two sets of authors, Thomas Merrill 
and Henry Smith and Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman, and 
discuss why their explanations of the numerus clausus illustrate why it 
should be more rigorously applied to emerging intangible rights. 
In Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus 
Clausus Principle,178 Merrill and Smith posit that information costs are 
the driving force behind the distinction between property and contract 
and thus the numerus clausus principle.179 They argue that permitting an 
unlimited number of property forms would cause third-parties interested 
in acquiring property rights to incur significant measurement costs.180 
Such costs arise often, because in order to avoid violating another’s 
property rights, the person faced with those rights must know what they 
are. These measurement costs do not affect the original parties to the 
transaction creating the novel property right, and the law does not 
intervene to protect these parties. The costs to other market participants, 
however, can be quite high.181 If I see a house that I want to buy, I know 
that the house can be held in only a limited number of ways. The 
owners might be tenants in common, joint tenants, or tenants by the 
entirety; they could own the house in fee simple, as life tenants, or in a 
defeasible fee. Because the permissible forms of ownership are in a 
closed set, the potential buyer needs to ask only a finite number of 
questions. On the other hand, if a landowner were permitted to fashion 
any estate she wished, potential buyers of all houses would be forced to 
ask an infinite number of questions about ownership.182 Therefore, they 
argue, if property interests are standardized, measurement costs are 
minimized.  
Prospective buyers, however, are not the only third-parties affected 
                                                                                                                     
 177. See, e.g., Davidson, supra note 176, at 1653 (viewing the fixed categories of property 
as regulatory platforms which “are primarily tools to assist legal actors—courts, legislatures, 
and other formal sources of legal recognition—in their regulatory role”); Hansmann & 
Kraakman, supra note 163, at S384 (explaining the numerus clausus as a solution to the 
problem of verification when two or more holders of rights in the same asset are not in privity of 
contract); Merrill & Smith, supra note 163, at 27 (justifying the numerus clausus as a means of 
reducing the external costs on other market participants); Parisi, supra note 176, at 625 
(explaining that “[i]f we could organize a public record sufficiently dependable to keep track of 
property rights, there would be no reason to limit their number”). 
 178. Merrill & Smith, supra note 163. 
 179. Merrill & Smith, supra note 163, at 9. 
 180. Merrill & Smith, supra note 163, at 69. 
 181. Merrill & Smith, supra note 163, at 29–31. 
 182. Merrill & Smith, supra note 163, at 27–32. As an example of an idiosyncratic 
property right, Merrill and Smith use a right to use a watch on Mondays only. Id. 
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by novel and perhaps indecipherable property rights. Henry Hansmann 
and Reinier Kraakman, in Property, Contract and Verification: The 
Numerus Clausus Problem and the Divisibility of Rights,183 focus not on 
the potential transferee of assets, but on co-owners and those charged 
with enforcement of property rights in assets.184 They see the main 
problem to be solved by the numerus clausus as one of verification and 
identify two contexts in which verification problems arise: coordination 
and enforcement.185 Verification arises in coordination because two co-
owners of an asset might not be in privity of contract.186 When parties 
are in privity of contract, the contract itself, agreed to by the parties, 
provides the verification mechanism.187 An enforcing court also needs 
to determine the extent of property rights.188 
As a simple example of a verification rule, Hansmann and Kraakman 
use the rule of possession.189 If possession were the sole verification 
rule, only the person in possession of an asset would have the right to 
transfer that asset.190 In a modern economy, however, possession is not 
a sufficient verification rule for several reasons. First, a possession rule 
would not allow partial transfers, such as non-possessory security 
interests. Second, possession as we know it is not possible for intangible 
assets.191  
While Merrill and Smith and Hansmann and Kraakman formulate 
their justifications for a numerus clausus differently, both sets of 
authors agree that standardization is valuable in identifying the 
intangible, or invisible, boundaries of property rights. Merrill and Smith 
thus describe the numerus clausus as being valuable in identifying the 
“dimensions of property rights that are least visible, and hence the most 
difficult for ordinary observers to measure.”192 Hansmann and 
Kraakman refine this description, as they believe that “the law is 
concerned with the physical dimensions of assets that are difficult for all 
parties concerned to verify.”193 According to Hansmann and Kraakman, 
verification rules help us identify the conveyable, or verifiable, 
                                                                                                                     
 183. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 163. 
 184. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 163, at S382. 
 185. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 163, at S382. 
 186. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 163, at S383. 
 187. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 163, at S383. 
 188. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 163, at S383–84. 
 189. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 163, at S383–84. 
 190. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 163, at S384. 
 191. Under the U.C.C., control substitutes for possession for certain types of intangibles. 
See U.C.C. § 8-106(c) (2005) (defining control of uncertificated securities), § 9-104 (defining 
control of deposit accounts), § 9-105 (defining control of electronic chattel paper).  
 192. Merrill & Smith, supra note 163, at 34. 
 193. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 163, at S416 n.81. 
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boundaries of property.194 Merrill and Smith make a similar point, 
explaining that the in rem, or property, strategy both identifies the 
resource and specifies the person, or owner, who can regulate the 
resource.195  
When the asset is tangible, the physical boundaries of the asset are 
visible, and we take identification of the resource for granted. 
Therefore, a fence is a verification mechanism that can define the 
physical boundaries of real estate.196 A person interested in a house can 
easily identify that house’s physical boundaries and characteristics. 
Little effort is required in verifying the square footage, number of 
bedrooms, and condition of the kitchen in a house. The less visible 
dimensions of real estate, such as life estates, leaseholds, and time 
shares, must be verified in other ways.197 
The foregoing justifications for the numerus clausus can help us 
distinguish rights that should be protected as property rights and rights 
that, as contract rights, can be infinitely customized. In another article, 
Merrill and Smith apply their work on the numerus clausus to make 
those distinctions. In The Property/Contract Interface, they explore 
legal institutions that do not fall clearly into the in rem and in personam 
categories, or institutions that “lie along [the] property/contract 
interface”198 in order to test their theory that information costs are 
crucial to the distinction between property and contract.199 To do so, 
they examine whether the law in various areas resembles contract law in 
situations in which two parties bear the bulk of the information costs 
and resembles property law in situations in which a large number of 
parties must bear information costs.200 The four institutions they chose 
to study—bailments, landlord-tenant law, security interests, and trusts—
bear an important similarity to many intangible rights, as, according to 
Merrill and Smith, those institutions “historically have been subject to 
disputes about whether they are ‘truly’ based on contract or on 
property.”201 These institutions all lie somewhere in the middle of the 
spectrum between “pure” contract, in which one person has rights 
against a single, identified person, and “pure” property, in which one 
person has rights against a large number of unidentified persons.202 
One example that Merrill and Smith give of such an institution is 
                                                                                                                     
 194. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 163, at S415. 
 195. Merrill & Smith, supra note 163, at 790. 
 196. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 163, at S416. 
 197. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 163, at S416.  
 198. Merrill & Smith, supra note 163, at 777. 
 199. Merrill & Smith, supra note 163, at 779. 
 200. Merrill & Smith, supra note 163, at 822. 
 201. Merrill & Smith, supra note 163, at 809. 
 202. Merrill & Smith, supra note 163, at 809. 
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landlord-tenant law.203 American law recognizes only four types of 
leases: the term of years, the periodic tenancy (such as the month-to-
month tenancy), the tenancy at will, and the tenancy at sufferance,204 
and two types of tenant transfers: assignment and sublease.205 If a lease 
were viewed as a pure contract, there would be no need for such 
standardization; the in personam strategy specifies use rights between 
specified individuals.206 Leases affect other parties, however, including 
future lessees who want to know when the property will become 
available and creditors of both the lessor and lessee who need to know 
the extent of the interest that is available to them if they must enforce 
their remedies.207  
Merrill and Smith conclude, with respect to each of their examples, 
that as the group of people affected by the right grows in number or the 
identity of the persons affected by the right becomes less-known (as is 
the case with rights transferred by standard form contracts), the law 
provides a mechanism to inform these persons of the extent of the right 
in question.208 For leases, these mechanisms take the form of immutable 
rules, such as the implied warranty of habitability, and standard 
property forms, such as the permissible tenancies.209 As I explain in the 
next sub-Part, emerging intangible assets also lie along the 
property/contract interface and virtual property can help us understand 
why emerging intangible assets fall into this category. 
C.  Why Standardization is Necessary for Rights in Intangible 
Assets  
The foregoing justifications for the numerus clausus are particularly 
relevant as new forms of intangible assets emerge. As explained above, 
the numerus clausus helps us to define the boundaries of property when 
those boundaries are invisible.210 In the tangible world, we know that 
there is a difference between the tangible asset and the intangible right 
in the asset because we can see the physical boundaries of the asset. 
Before the advent of virtual property, however, the boundaries of 
intangible assets were invisible to human eyes. We can see a book, and 
even though we cannot see the copyright in the book, we recognize that 
the ownership right in the book is different from the ownership of the 
copyright. The law has long recognized this as well. The Copyright Act 
                                                                                                                     
 203. Merrill & Smith, supra note 163, at 820. 
 204. Merrill & Smith, supra note 163, at 832. 
 205. Merrill & Smith, supra note 163, at 830. 
 206. Merrill & Smith, supra note 163, at 790. 
 207. Merrill & Smith, supra note 163, at 833. 
 208. See generally Merrill & Smith, supra note 163, at 833 (discussing these mechanisms). 
 209. Merrill & Smith, supra note 163, at 833. 
 210. See supra notes 194–98 and accompanying text.  
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provides that ownership of the material embodiment of a copyrighted 
work does not convey ownership of the copyright,211 and because of the 
first sale doctrine in copyright law, the purchaser of a book is permitted 
to sell it without infringing the copyright holder’s intellectual property 
rights.212 If I own a book and another person steals it, that person has 
interfered with my ownership interest in the book and could be held 
liable for conversion. If the thief makes one hundred copies of the book 
and sells the copies, the thief has violated distinct property rights held 
by another person—the rights of reproduction and distribution granted 
by copyright law to the copyright holder.213 
On the other hand, while we can see a domain name, its physical 
manifestation looks like a more familiar intangible—a trademark. In 
fact, it is impossible, by simply looking at a domain name, to appreciate 
that the name might incorporate both trademark and other property 
rights.214 Therefore, whether the domain name incorporates a trademark 
or not, a court might be tempted to apply trademark law to resolve a 
conflict over rights in the name. A court did exactly that in Dorer v. 
Arel.215 Analyzing the question of whether a domain name could be 
garnished by a creditor, the court concluded that a domain name that is 
eligible for trademark protection is a form of “property,” while one that 
is not so eligible, such as a generic name, “arguably entails only 
contract, not property rights.”216 Unfortunately, the analogy led the 
court to reach an illogical result. Generic names command large 
amounts of money on the market, and are freely transferable. Names 
incorporating trademarks, however, are generally useless to anyone but 
the trademark holder, because they cannot be transferred without the 
goodwill of the business.217 Because, under the applicable law, only 
                                                                                                                     
 211. 17 U.S.C. § 202 (2006). 
 212. Bobbs-Merrill v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 350 (1908); see also UMG Recordings, Inc. v. 
Augusto, 558 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1065 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (rejecting a record company’s attempt to 
restrict, by license, the sale of promotional CDs after the CDs were given to industry insiders).  
 213. 17 U.S.C. § 106; see also Vernor v. Autodesk, 555 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1168 (W.D. 
Wash. 2008) (“First sale does not, however, exhaust other rights, such as the copyright holder’s 
right to prohibit copying of the copy he sells.”). 
 214. Joshua Fairfield identified domain names as a type of “virtual property” that mimics 
tangible world property because it is “rivalrous, persistent, and interconnected.” Fairfield, supra 
note 8, at 1055. Only one person can have any word in a top-level domain. Therefore, while one 
party can own united.com and another can own united.net, there cannot be two uniteds in the 
.com top-level domain.  
 215. 60 F. Supp. 2d 558 (E.D. Va. 1999). In Dorer, the plaintiff had been awarded a money 
judgment against the defendant, and wanted to satisfy that judgment by garnishing the 
defendant’s domain name. 
 216. Id. at 560–61. 
 217. United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918) (“There is no such 
thing as property in a trade-mark except as a right appurtenant to an established business or 
trade in connection with which the mark is employed.”). 
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property subject to a judgment lien could be garnished,218 the creditor 
was deprived of an asset that had great monetary value to its debtor.219 
Domain names, like tangible personal property, can also embody 
several property interests. One is in the use of the word, such as “wine” 
or “coca-cola,” which may or may not be protected by trademark law.220 
The other is in the string of letters, such as www.wine.com, that directs 
people to the domain name owner’s website. The string is a unique 
identifier that is rivalrous and can therefore be controlled by one person. 
As a result, a person who causes the unauthorized transfer of a domain 
name should be subject to an action for conversion. While some courts 
have recognized such an action, they have done so by applying 
convoluted reasoning that misses the basic point that a numerus clausus 
analysis would catch: A domain name can be owned in the same way 
that a book or a bicycle can be owned.221 Instead, in probably the most 
prominent domain name conversion case, Kremen v. Cohen,222 the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a domain name could be the 
subject of a conversion action because it was “merged in a 
document.”223 Under the applicable state law, only an intangible asset 
merged in a document, such as a promissory note, could be converted, 
so the court found that the domain name system, which is both 
intangible itself and distributed among several locations, sufficed as the 
“document.” 224 
Domain names are not the only intangible assets that might be the 
subjects of a conversion action. In Thyroff v. Nationwide Mutual 
Insurance Co.,225 the court held that electronic business records could 
be converted.226 The court recognized that a person can exercise 
dominion over such a record by pressing the “delete” button, but 
ultimately based its conclusion on the fact that there is no difference 
                                                                                                                     
 218. Dorer, 60 F. Supp. 2d at 559. 
 219. Id. 
 220. In this example, the word “wine,” if used to describe wine, is not eligible for 
trademark protection, while the word “coca-cola,” used to describe a certain soft drink, is. See 
15 U.S.C. § 1052(e) (2006) (indicating a mark is not eligible for trademark registration if, when 
“used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant is merely descriptive . . . of them.”).  
 221. See, e.g., Kremen v. Cohen, 337 F.3d 1024, 1034, 1036 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding that a 
domain name can be the subject of a conversion action because it is merged in a “document,” 
the domain name system). Thyroff v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 864 N.E.2d 1272, 1278 
(N.Y. 2007), following Kremen, held that electronic business records could be converted. The 
court recognized that a person can exercise dominion over such a record by pressing the 
“delete” button, but ultimately based its conclusion on the fact that there is no difference 
between the monetary value of paper records and the monetary value of electronic records. Id. 
 222. 337 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 223. Id. at 1031 (emphasis omitted). 
 224. Id. at 1033–35. 
 225. 864 N.E.2d 1272 (N.Y. 2007). 
 226. Id. at 1278. 
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between the monetary value of paper records and the monetary value of 
electronic records.227  
The numerus clausus principle could have helped the courts in both 
Thyroff and Kremen come to more useful conclusions, conclusions that 
could guide courts in analyzing rights in all sorts of emerging intangible 
assets. Conversion is defined in the R statement (Second) of Torts a  
“an intentional exercise of dominion or control over a chattel which so 
seriously interferes with the right of another to control it that the actor 
may justly be required to pay the other the full value of the chattel.”228 
Many of the standard property forms are defined in terms of the 
holder’s right to possess the asset involved. For example, a defining 
characteristic of a present estate in land is the “present right to exclusive 
possession.”229 If we recognize standard property rights in intangible 
assets, we can appreciate that in at least one important respect, domain 
names and electronic business records are identical—both can be 
exclusively possessed.  
Because we cannot see the boundaries of domain names and 
electronic business records, we have difficulty appreciating this 
similarity. Using the property involved in the Bragg and Eros disputes 
to illustrate the nature of intangible assets can help us appreciate why 
the numerus clausus hould apply to intangible assets in the same way 
that it applies to real estate and tangible assets. Because virtual worlds 
simulate the tangible world in many ways, we can see and experience 
the differences between virtual world land and virtual world trademarks. 
That experience helps us recognize that some intangible assets have 
boundaries in the same way that tangible assets have boundaries. The 
numerus clausus, with its standard forms, helps us identify the legal 
significance of those boundaries. In other words, if I can exclude a 
person from my virtual bicycle in the same way that I can exclude a 
person from my domain name, then perhaps my rights in the virtual 
bicycle and the virtual domain name are legally identical, regardless of 
the terms of the contracts conveying rights in those assets. Because we 
can experience virtual assets in this way, we expect that we can own 
them in the same way that we can own books and bicycles. Standard 
property forms acknowledge such similarities.  
Standardized property forms serve a notice function, and might be 
particularly useful in an environment in which the predominant method 
of contracting is by online terms of use. Notice of rights in intangible 
assets is notoriously difficult to process not only because the assets 
themselves are invisible, but because the rights are often granted in 
standard form electronically presented contracts. Courts usually find 
                                                                                                                     
 227. Id. 
 228. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 222A(1) (1965) (emphasis added).  
 229. STOEBUCK &  WHITMAN , supra note 75, § 2.1. 
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that agreements like the Second Life Terms of Service meet the 
requirements for contract formation; they routinely find acceptance 
when the offeree is required to click “I agree”230 and they are 
increasingly doing so when a click is not required.231 Despite the fact 
that courts often find assent to these terms, a major criticism of 
electronically presented agreements is that they often do not provide 
offerees with sufficient notice of their terms.232 Allowing unfettered 
freedom of contract in the transfer of these rights is also a problem 
because of the ease and frequency with which online contracts are 
changed. In the Second Life Terms of Service, Linden reserves the right 
to amend the terms “at any time in its sole discretion,” and Linden 
claims that such amendments will be effective when the amended 
Terms of Service are posted on the Second Life website.233 Assuming 
that such an agreement is enforceable, its operation would require the 
numerous Second Life members to devote time and effort re-learning 
the extent of their rights. Terms of service such as these, which affect 
numerous definite persons, create the very types of institutions that 
Merrill and Smith define as between property and contract.234 
                                                                                                                     
 230. See, e.g., Treiber & Straub v. UPS, 474 F.3d 379, 385 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding 
plaintiff to contract terms because he was required to click his agreement to them); Nancy S. 
Kim, Clicking and Cringing, 86 OR. L. REV. 797, 843 (2007) (“Courts have refused to uphold 
clickwrap agreements if users do not have sufficient notice of their terms, or do not have to 
affirmatively accept the terms of use.”);  Juliet M. Moringiello, Signals, Assent and Internet 
Contracting, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 1307, 1320–23 (2005) (explaining opinions holding that a 
click manifests assent to contract terms).  
 231. See, e.g., Hubbert v. Dell Corp., 835 N.E.2d 113, 121 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (recognizing 
that a prominently displayed hyperlink can give adequate notice of the terms found behind the 
link); Hotels.com, L.P. v. Canales, 195 S.W.3d 147, 155–56 (Tex. Ct. App. 2006) (noting that 
the agreement before it could not be “neatly characterized as either a ‘click-wrap’ or ‘browse-
wrap’ agreement” and focusing instead on whether the users of the website had adequate notice 
of the challenged terms).  
 232. See Stephen E. Friedman, Protecting Consumers from Arbitration Provisions in 
Cyberspace, the Federal Arbitration Act and E-Sign Notwithstanding, 57 CATH. U. L. REV. 377, 
399 (2008) (“The concept of assent, already more theoretical than real in the world of mass-
market written contracts, is strained even further in the world of online contracting . . . .”); Mark 
A. Lemley, Terms of Use, 91 MINN. L. REV. 459, 482 (2006) (concluding that “the problems 
terms of use pose stem from a combination of factors: judicial willingness to weaken or even 
eliminate the notion of assent when presented with a form that purports to be a contract, and the 
ease with which technology allows companies . . . to present forms that purport to be 
contracts”); Francis J. Mootz III, After the Battle of the Forms: Commercial Contracting in the 
Electronic Age, 4 ISJLP 271, 289 (2008) (“There is every reason to believe that a formalist 
endorsement of click-wrap agreements will not capture the parties’ ‘bargain in fact’ in some 
cases.”). 
 233. Second Life, Terms of Service, supra note 96, ¶ 1. Not all courts agree that a web 
posting will result in an effective contract modification. See Douglas v. U.S. District Court, 495 
F.3d 1062, 1066–67 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that a consumer was not bound by a modification 
posted to a website because web posting did not give him adequate notice of the amendments). 
 234. Merrill & Smith, supra note 163, at 786. 
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By arguing for a numerus clausus approach, I am not necessarily 
arguing that only the property forms that exist today should be applied 
to intangible assets. It is possible that the nature of some intangible 
assets is such that new forms need to be recognized and brought into the 
standard framework. For example, some have made this argument with 
respect to software because of the ease of copying software,235 and 
James Grimmelmann has observed that virtual worlds such as Second 
Life should be viewed as feudal societies.236 In the United States, new 
forms of interests in real estate, such as condominiums and time shares, 
have been recognized by legislatures.237 Acknowledging that a new 
standard form may be necessary should not open the door to infinitely 
customizable licenses, however. The numerus clausus principle 
demands some standardization so that market participants will know the 
extent of the rights that they are acquiring.  
Virtual worlds raise myriad property issues, as illustrated by the 
Bragg and Eros disputes. The virtual world context allows us to truly 
visualize the rights at issue; we can see virtual land on a computer. 
When we experience intangible assets in this way, it becomes clear that 
contracts such as the Second Life Terms of Service attempt to create 
novel property forms. Virtual world assets thus illustrate how property 
rights in intangible assets should be analyzed within a structure of 
standard forms. Courts honoring the numerus clausus principle should 
not allow the creation of novel property forms, and indeed do not do so 
when the asset transferred is tangible. Therefore, the numerus clausus 
principle can help us understand the extent of the property rights 
granted in virtual world and other intangible assets regardless of the 





                                                                                                                     
 235. For instance, arguments have been made that the first sale right, an important 
component of the package of rights belonging to an owner of a copy of a work protected by 
copyright, should not apply to digitally-transmitted software because the transferor, in 
transmitting the software, both makes a copy and sends it. Such an action affects not only the 
copyright holder’s distribution right, which is limited by the first sale rule, but also the 
reproduction right, which is not. See, e.g., REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, 
SECTION 104 OF THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT 78–92 (2001), available at 
http://www.copyright.gov/reports/studies/dmca/sec-104-report-vol-1.pdf.  
 236. James Grimmelmann, Virtual World Feudalism, 118 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 126, 126 
(2009) (“The similarity between ownership of land in feudal England and in Second Life 
suggests that offline courts should protect user interests in virtual items, gradually, without 
treating them as full-blown modern ‘property.’”),  available at http://thepocketpart.org/2009/01/ 
19/grimmelmann.html. 
 237. Merrill & Smith, supra note 163, at 15–16, 18. 
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V.  WHAT VIRTUAL PROPERTY CAN DO FOR PROPERTY 
A.  Why a License?  
The contracts conveying intangible assets carry different names, 
such as “Terms of Service,”238 “Service Agreement,”239 “Terms of 
Use,”240 and “End User License Agreement,”241 but share a common 
characteristic: many of them attempt to create and convey novel and 
confusing property rights. For instance, the Second Life Terms of 
Service discussed above appear to both grant and deny property 
rights.242 The same problem exists with some mass-market software 
licenses. In its license for Microsoft Office,243 Microsoft appears to give 
the software transferee many of the important rights of an owner of the 
material embodiment of the software,244 yet still calls its agreement a 
license. 
This pervasive use of licenses begs the question: “Why?” In all areas 
of law, a license is understood to be a grant of permission that does not 
convey a right of possession to the licensee. In the intellectual property 
arena, a license is permission to do something that would otherwise 
constitute infringement.245 Licenses today, however, are increasingly 
used to transfer rights in other types of intangible assets, such as the 
virtual assets developed in online environments such as Second Life.246 
The word “license,” however, does not communicate any defined 
property right and courts defer to freedom of contract when faced with 
license agreements.247 
                                                                                                                     
 238. Second Life, Terms of Service, supra note 96. 
 239. Network Solutions, Service Agreement, http://www.networksolutions.com/legal/static 
-service-agreement.jsp (last visited Nov. 5, 2009). 
 240. World of Warcraft, Terms of Use Agreement, supra note 89. 
 241. World of Warcraft, End User License Agreement, http://www.worldofwarcraft.com/le 
gal/eula.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2009).  
 242. See supra Part III.B.  
 243. Microsoft Office 2008 for Mac Home & Student Edition, Microsoft Software License 
Terms, http://download.microsoft.com/documents/useterms/Office%20for%20Mac%20Home% 
20and%20Student_2008_English_8e9a97ac-8ca6-47bc-8039-fc6048a94cdc.pdf (last visited 
Nov. 5, 2009) [hereinafter Microsoft License]. 
 244. For instance, the “license” recognizes the licensee’s right to transfer the software to 
another person, so long as the licensee deletes his own copy of the software, thus recognizing 
the right of an owner of a copy to transfer that copy. Id. ¶ 12. The licensee is also granted the 
right to make a backup copy of the software, a right given by the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. 
§ 117(a)(2) (2006), to “owners” of software copies. Microsoft License, supra note 243, ¶ 6.  
 245. RAYMOND T. NIMMER, INFORMATION LAW § 11:2 (2005).  
 246. See Madison, supra note 148, at 291 (“With the coming of the Internet, the licensing 
norm developed for computer programs has been gradually but seamlessly extended to all forms 
of copyrighted works in digital form, including both ‘creative’ websites and collections of 
digitized data.”). 
 247. See, e.g., ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Shrinkwrap 
licenses are enforceable unless their terms are objectionable on grounds applicable to contracts 
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A close look at virtual world assets should illustrate why an 
intangible right should not be immediately conflated with the contract 
conveying it. It is understandable that one might make this mistake with 
a domain name; to buy a domain name, one enters into a contract on a 
website and pays a yearly fee.248 The product that the buyer receives 
looks, to the untrained eye, like just a string of words, and the string of 
words performs the magic of ushering humans around the World Wide 
Web. It is not common to buy words, though, so it is natural for us to 
assume that what the domain name purchaser is buying might be a right 
to services. On the other hand, virtual currency functions like a known 
asset, “real” currency.  
This is not an Article about software; but the story of the evolution 
of licensing as the predominant method of transferring rights in 
software249 provides a good backdrop against which to evaluate the 
emerging practice of licensing other intangible assets in the electronic 
world.  
Courts tend to accept, without much analysis, the proposition that in 
a software transaction denominated as a “license,” there is no transfer of 
ownership of the material object on which the software is embodied.250 
Proponents of the practice of software licensing justify licensing by 
arguing that the nature of software mandates that transactions in goods 
and transactions in software be treated differently.251 Certainly, it is 
easy to copy software,252 and many software vendors place restrictions 
aimed at controlling distribution in their license agreements.253 A 
detailed discussion of software licensing is beyond the scope of this 
                                                                                                                     
in general . . . .”). 
 248. See, e.g., Network Solutions, Service Agreement Version Number 8.0, 
http://www.networksolutions.com/legal/static-service-agreement.jsp#general (last visited Nov. 
5, 2009). 
 249. For two excellent discussions of the evolution of licensing in the software industry, 
see Madison, supra note 148, at 310–16; Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, The New Servitudes, 96 
GEO. L.J. 885, 917–21 (2008).  
 250. Rothchild, supra note 146, at 26–28; see, e.g., MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, 
Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 519 (9th Cir. 1993) (noting, without analysis, that defendants were not 
protected as “owners” under § 117 of the Copyright Act because they had entered into license 
agreements). 
 251. Christian H. Nadan, Software Licensing in the 21st Century: Are Software “Licenses” 
Really Sales, and How Will the Software Industry Respond?, 32 AIPLA Q. J. 555, 613 (2004); 
Raymond T. Nimmer, An Essay on Article 2’s Irrelevance to Licensing Agreements, 40 LOY. 
L.A. L. REV. 235, 237 (2006); Raymond T. Nimmer, Through the Looking Glass: What Courts 
and UCITA Say About the Scope of Contract Law in the Information Age, 38 DUQ. L. REV. 255, 
256 (2000).  
 252. See Maureen A. O’Rourke, Drawing the Boundary Between Copyright and Contract: 
Copyright Preemption of Software License Terms, 45 DUKE L.J. 479, 489 (1995). 
 253. See, e.g., ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1450 (7th Cir. 1996); Adobe Sys., 
Inc. v. Stargate Software, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1055 (N.D. Cal. 2002).  
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Article, but assuming that software is different, then licensing, or 
something like a license, such as a sale with restrictions, may be 
justified.254 In order to determine whether a license is justified, 
however, it is necessary to consider the nature of the interest being 
transferred. Because virtual worlds afford us the opportunity to study 
intangible assets with different fundamental characteristics, they can 
help lawmaking institutions to look beyond the “intangible” label and 
focus on the important characteristics of the assets transferred. While 
software vendors may have a justifiable interest in controlling the 
distribution of their product, it is hard to see how Linden would have an 
interest in controlling the further use of its currency, the Linden, any 
more than the Bank of America would have an interest in controlling 
the use of U.S. dollars in a depositor’s account.  
For several reasons, software transferors may want to characterize 
their transfer agreements as licenses, not only of the computer program, 
which is an intangible work of authorship for copyright purposes, but 
also of the tangible medium on which that work of authorship is 
inscribed. For example, a transfer of rights by license might avoid 
application of the first-sale doctrine, which limits the exclusive right of 
a copyright holder to distribute copies of her work.255 The Copyright 
Act gives the benefit of the first sale doctrine to a person in possession 
of a copy of a work if that person is the “owner” of the copy.256 
“Owner,” however, is not defined in the Act.257 Once a copyright owner 
sells a copy, she can no longer control distribution of that copy.258 The 
copyright holder retains all of her other exclusive rights, such as the 
right to reproduce her work, even after sale.259 A lesser justification for 
using a license may be to avoid the application of Article 2 of the 
Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.), as Article 2 governs sales of 
goods.260  
                                                                                                                     
 254. Molly Van Houweling suggests that the rights conveyed by mass-market software 
licenses are, in fact, servitudes. Van Houweling, supra note 249, at 889.  
 255. Under the Copyright Act, a license does not trigger first sale. 17 U.S.C. § 109(d) 
(2006). See also Madison, supra note 148, at 281 (“[T]he software license is designed to defeat 
copyright law’s doctrine of first sale, which would otherwise permit the ‘licensee’ to re-
distribute that copy of the program . . . .”). 
 256. 17 U.S.C. § 109(d). 
 257. Rothchild, supra note 146, at 17. 
 258. Rothchild, supra note 146, at 12.  
 259. Rothchild, supra note 146, at 9–10. 
 260. See generally Jean Braucher, Contracting out of Article 2 Using a “License” Label: A 
Strategy That Should Not Work for Software Products, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 261, 275 (2006) 
(noting that “Article 2 defines a sale in terms of the passing of title for a price.”). Elizabeth 
Winston gives several other justifications for transferring by license rather than sale, including 
the ability to withhold warranties and “frustrate fair use” in a license. Elizabeth I. Winston, Why 
Sell What You Can License? Contracting Around Statutory Protection of Intellectual Property, 
14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 93, 102 (2006). Licenses also enable software developers to engage in 
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Software licensing has many critics. Many deem the practice to be 
controversial because of its impact on the balance struck by copyright 
law.261 These commentators and others also recognize that licenses 
transfer novel, and perhaps impermissible, property rights. John 
Rothchild has suggested that the software companies may be using the 
license label to describe a “new species of property relation,”262 and 
Michael Madison has suggested that the typical license of a software 
copy might not be a license at all, but a lease, a bailment, or a 
conditional gift.263  
While software vendors often purport to transfer the tangible media 
containing software by license, licenses of other tangible personal 
property are almost unheard of. Using a license for the transfer of a car 
as an example, Jean Braucher, in Contracting out of Article 2 Using a 
“License” Label: A Strategy That Should Not Work for Software 
Products, demonstrates that the license label does not “describe some 
necessary objective reality.”264 Rothchild made a similar point when he 
observed that “to say that one ‘licenses’ a material object . . . is [a] 
nonstandard usage of the term ‘license.’”265 Put another way, the license 
label does not necessarily signal an identifiable property interest. Most 
people would be offended by the use of a license to transfer an 
automobile; few are offended by the use of a license to transfer 
software. Elizabeth Winston identifies one reason for this, noting that 
“consumers bring with them a preconceived notion of a set of rights 
when they purchase books, one that does not limit the consumer’s use of 
the book. No such notion, however, existed for software. Software was 
new, difficult to protect, expensive to develop, and easy to replicate.”266 
Winston’s point is an important one: licensing has grown as an 
important method of transferring software in part because consumers 
had no preconceived notions about software. One could make the same 
observation today with respect to other emerging intangible assets. 
Today, a prospective member of Second Life is not surprised to see 
license language in the clickwrap Terms of Service because that 
individual has likely seen license terms in many other clickwrap 
agreements (if she bothered to read them), most of which were likely 
related to software delivered to her electronically. Likewise, it might not 
surprise a purchaser of a domain name to be presented with a “Service 
Agreement.” 
                                                                                                                     
price discrimination in order to price software according to its value to the user. Nadan, supra 
note 251, at 557, 559.  
 261. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 148, at 1246; Madison, supra note 148, at 279–80; 
Rothchild, supra note 146, at 32–35; Winston, supra note 260, at 102. 
 262. Rothchild, supra note 146, at 35. 
 263. Madison, supra note 148, at 306–08. 
 264. Braucher, supra note 260, at 267. 
 265. Rothchild, supra note 146, at 33. 
 266. Winston, supra note 260, at 100; see also O’Rourke, supra note 252, at 488–90. 
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It might seem that the intangibility of software is the distinguishing 
characteristic that makes licenses acceptable for software and 
unacceptable for tangible personal property such as books. This 
assumption, however, ignores the fact that software vendors purport to 
license not only the software that they transfer, but also the tangible disk 
on which the software resides. In accepting this practice, courts tend to 
confuse the “computer program and the material object on which it is 
distributed.”267 As Rothchild has explained, the distinction between the 
physical embodiment and the copyrighted content has become blurred 
in the software context.268 Using the sale of a book as an illustration, he 
explains that the sale of the physical object (the book) conveys title only 
to the physical object, not to the copyright to that book.269 Conversely, 
transfer of the copyright to a book has no effect on the ownership of a 
physical embodiment of that book.270 
The problem that Rothchild identified is exacerbated when the 
software is not embodied in anything that we consider tangible. This is 
where virtual property can contribute to our understanding of property 
law; just as the assets involved in Bragg and Eros were intangible assets 
in which the parties claimed different types of property interests, so are 
the software program and the copyright in the software program.271 But 
as software is delivered electronically rather than by disk, it is more 
difficult to appreciate the difference between the program and the 
copyright in the program and it becomes harder to separate the 
intellectual property from the material embodiment of the intellectual 
property.272 Because of this blurred distinction between the tangible 
copy and the intangible copy, courts may find it even more difficult to 
reject software licenses.  
This again, is where virtual worlds provide us with the opportunity 
to identify the significant aspects of property. Joshua Fairfield proposed 
a theory of virtual property when he identified the characteristics that 
separate some intangible assets from others.273 Bragg and Eros illustrate 
these characteristics more sharply. In virtual worlds, the distinction 
between the possessory ownership right and the intellectual property 
right should be clear. A bicycle in a virtual world can be used and 
transferred. The intangible item that is used and transferred is distinct 
from the copyright in that item. The ability to experience these 
intangible assets in ways that mimic the tangible experience is what 
                                                                                                                     
 267. Rothchild, supra note 146, at 28 (emphasis omitted). 
 268. Rothchild, supra note 146, at 29–31. 
 269. Rothchild, supra note 146, at 29–30. 
 270. Rothchild, supra note 146, at 30. 
 271. Madison, supra note 148, at 279–80. Madison describes the program as the 
“electronic instantiation of the instructions that comprise the computer program.” Id. 
 272. Madison, supra note 148, at 291–92. 
 273. Fairfield, supra note 8, at 1063–64. 
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makes virtual property valuable as a vehicle for understanding property 
rights and interpreting license agreements with an understanding of 
property forms in mind.  
B.  Interpreting Licenses Using Property Forms 
A numerus clausus approach to rights in intangible assets might 
eliminate some of the confusion about the rights granted by license 
agreements, and might enable courts to recognize that the rights granted 
in some licenses are not license rights at all. Applying the numerus 
clausus to the license of a software copy, it is clear that the license does 
create something else. Again, virtual worlds, by giving us intangible 
assets with visible physical boundaries, can help us to understand the 
rationale for this. Without describing the numerus clausus principle by 
name, Rothchild has suggested an application of it, arguing that if the 
“licensee” of the physical embodiment of software (referring to CD-
ROMs and floppy disks) is not required to return the item during its 
useful life, then the license should be classified as a sale.274 Courts do 
reclassify licenses as sales, but they do so in a non-uniform manner.275 
An appreciation of the different property forms embodied in intangible 
assets can help courts better interpret licenses for all types of emerging 
intangible assets.  
American law implicitly applies the numerus clausus not only to 
estates in land, but also to personal property transactions.276 The rules 
by which courts will reclassify leases as sales are well-established and 
codified to a limited extent. The most common methods of transferring 
rights to tangible personal property are sale, lease, and security interest. 
Courts commonly reclassify transfers that are described as one type (a 
lease, for instance) as another (a sale) if the transfer carries the 
identifying characteristics of the other type of transfer.277 This is a 
recognition that there are limits on the ability of contracting parties to 
customize property interests.  
Under the U.C.C., if a “lease” looks too much like a security interest, 
it is a security interest. The U.C.C. contains a bright-line test that 
incorporates the economic realities of lease and sale transactions.278 
Under this test, if the structure of the transfer transaction indicates that 
the transferor does not intend to receive anything of value at the end of 
the lease term, that lease is really a sale.279 Therefore, a lease with no 
                                                                                                                     
 274. Rothchild, supra note 146, at 35. 
 275. See infra notes 292–318 and accompanying text. 
 276. U.C.C. § 1-203, at 42 (2005). 
 277. This type of reclassification has been codified in the Uniform Commercial Code. Id. 
§ 1-203(b)(1)–(4). 
 278. Id. 
 279. Id. 
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termination option is in fact a secured sale if one of four elements is 
met.280 These elements reflect the economic differences between sales 
and leases. For instance, a lease is in fact a secured sale if there is no 
termination option and the lease term is equal to or greater than the 
remaining economic life of the goods.281 The lack of a termination right 
is essential to the application of the bright-line test; when a transferor 
transfers an asset to someone else for an unlimited term, the transfer 
looks like the transfer of a fee simple. 
The rules reclassifying leases as secured sales apply only to goods. 
When the transaction is reclassified, the property interest that the parties 
intended to convey by their contract is transformed. Rather than 
transferring a leasehold interest with a reversionary interest in the 
transferor, the agreement transfers a fee simple, and the transferor 
retains a security interest.  
The bright-line test tells a court only when a transfer definitely 
creates a security interest. It does not exclude other purported lease 
transfers from reclassification, however. Courts reclassifying transfers 
falling outside of the bright-line test also apply a numerus clausus 
analysis. Courts reclassify leases by applying traditional property 
concepts, and the use of property language is clear in the opinions: a 
transferor must intend to retain a “meaningful reversionary interest” in 
order to have its lease form respected.282 Therefore, in a case in which 
the “lessee” had no practical ability to return the transferred goods 
because of the cost and difficulty of removal, the court reclassified the 
license as a sale.283 
Another reclassification rule is found in U.C.C. § 2-401. If a party 
transfers goods and attempts to retain title to those goods after the 
                                                                                                                     
 280. Id. (reclassifying a lease as a sale with a security interest if there is no termination 
option and one of the four following elements is present: “(1) the original term of the lease is 
equal to or greater than the remaining economic life of the goods; (2) the lessee is bound to 
renew the lease for the remaining economic life of the goods or is bound to become the owner of 
the goods; (3) the lessee has an option to renew the lease for the remaining economic life of the 
goods for no additional consideration or for nominal additional consideration upon compliance 
with the lease agreement; or (4) the lessee has an option to become the owner of the goods for 
no additional consideration or for nominal additional consideration upon compliance with the 
lease agreement”). 
 281. Id. § 1-203(b). For an excellent discussion of the lease-sale distinction under the 
U.C.C., see generally Corinne Cooper, Identifying a Personal Property Lease Under the UCC, 
49 OHIO ST. L.J. 195, 197 (1988) (noting the law has never provided a consistent framework to 
distinguish between a sale and a lease in the personal property area). 
 282. WorldCom, Inc. v. GE Global Asset Mgmt. Servs. (In re WorldCom, Inc.), 339 B.R. 
56, 71 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006) (emphasis omitted); In re QDS Components, Inc., 292 B.R. 313, 
342–43 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2002). 
 283. In re WorldCom, Inc., 339 B.R. at 73–74 (involving communications satellite 
equipment). 
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transfer, the reservation of title is limited to a security interest.284 Some 
describe this as an example of the Code’s functional approach, defining 
this approach as one that classifies “with an eye to whether it produces 
good results.”285 Alternatively, this reclassification could be described 
as another application of the numerus clausus: a person who gives up 
possession of goods permanently, and for a price, has sold those goods.  
Licenses are also subject to reclassification by courts. As noted 
above, the term “license” in itself does not communicate any property 
interest, as a license is a contract. Earlier in this Article, I described 
scripted and non-scripted virtual worlds.286 In both types of these 
worlds, the virtual world operators describe the rights they convey as 
license rights.287 A comparison of the Second Life and World of 
Warcraft licenses, however, show that the rights that licensors attempt 
to convey are very different. To some, the rights conveyed by Blizzard 
(World of Warcraft’s developer) and Linden might appear to be similar. 
After all, they both convey some kind of intangible asset in a virtual 
world. Blizzard, however, intends that World of Warcraft members use 
in-world items for one purpose, the progression of a scripted game. 
Linden intends that its members will develop a vibrant world in which 
business should thrive.288 
Some courts analyzing licenses, like courts analyzing leases, hold 
that the label given to a transfer is not determinative. Like the Second 
Life Terms of Service described earlier in this Article, software licenses 
may also ambiguously describe the rights transferred. The Microsoft 
End User License Agreements provide an example of this ambiguity. 
While the license states clearly that “[t]he software is licensed, not 
sold,”289 the agreement appears to give the transferee rights that she 
would have under the first sale doctrine, as it permits the transferee to 
transfer the software, and the agreement, to a third-party. The first 
transferee is permitted to transfer the software so long as she removes 
the software from her computer.290  
The rules for reclassifying licenses as sales are not as established as 
those for reclassifying leases as sales. Some courts accept the license 
                                                                                                                     
 284. U.C.C. § 2-401.  
 285. Braucher, supra note 260, at 275. 
 286. See supra notes 76–92 and accompanying text. 
 287. See Second Life Terms of Service, supra note 96, at ¶ 1.4 (describing the users’ right 
to their virtual currency as a “limited license right”); World of Warcraft Terms of Use, supra 
note 89, at ¶¶ 7, 11 (stating that the user has “no ownership or other property interest in the 
account” and forbidding transfers of game items). 
 288. The Second Life website tells the world that “[o]ne of the most exciting aspects of 
Second Life is its vibrant marketplace for virtual goods and services.” Second Life, The 
Marketplace, http://secondlife.com/whatis/marketplace.php (last visited Nov. 5, 2009). 
 289. Microsoft License, supra note 243, at ¶ 5. 
 290. Microsoft License, supra note 243, at ¶ 12. 
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label without question when the license is for software.291 Other courts, 
however, have applied the same sort of economic realities test as that 
applied to leases. Unlike the economic realities test used to distinguish 
leases from secured transactions, however, these tests have differed 
depending on the context in which they were applied.  
For example, in Microsoft v. DAK Industries, Inc. (In re DAK 
Industries, Inc.),292 the court had to distinguish between a lease and a 
license in order to determine whether payments due under the 
agreement were entitled to administrative expense priority in the 
licensee’s bankruptcy.293 The economic distinction that the court had to 
consider in that case was the distinction between a pre-petition creditor 
whose claim arose before the bankruptcy petition and the obligee under 
an executory contract whose claim would continue to accrue after the 
petition.294 Because it was determining the moment at which the 
payments were due rather than when the property rights transferred, the 
court focused primarily on the payment schedule in ruling that the 
license was analogous to a sale transaction and therefore, the licensor 
was a pre-petition creditor.295 Property forms played a subsidiary role in 
the court’s opinion, as the court recognized that the debtor, as a 
software distributor, obtained a “right to sell” in its license, rather than 
the “permission to use” that a traditional license grants.296 
Other courts have focused more clearly on the duration of the 
possessory interest transferred. In UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Augusto,297 
the court likewise applied an “economic realities” test to distinguish a 
license from a sale.298 At issue in that case was not software, but 
promotional recordings of music.299 Every CD at issue had a label with 
license language that stated that the CDs were the property of the 
plaintiff and that recipients were not permitted to transfer the 
recordings.300 The court, while classifying its analysis as an economic 
realities analysis, in fact inquired into the property rights granted by the 
“license.”301 Because the recipient was granted perpetual possession of 
                                                                                                                     
 291. See, e.g., MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518–19, 518 n.5 (9th 
Cir. 1993) (noting, without analysis, that defendants were not protected as “owners” under § 117 
of the Copyright Act because they had entered into license agreements). 
 292. 66 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 293. Id. at 1092, 1095. 
 294. Under the Bankruptcy Code, a “creditor” is any person with a prepetition claim 
against the debtor. 11 U.S.C. § 101 (10)(A) (2006). A trustee can assume or reject any executory 
contract of the debtor. Id. § 365(a). 
 295. In re DAK Indus., Inc., 66 F.3d at 1094–95. 
 296. Id. at 1095. 
 297. 558 F. Supp. 2d 1055 (C.D. Cal. 2008). 
 298. Id. at 1062. 
 299. Id. at 1058. 
 300. Id. 
 301. Id. at 1060. 
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the CDs and was not required to return them, the court found that the 
CDs were sold, not licensed.302 The court also found it relevant that the 
asset at issue was a CD, not software, and observed that “music CDs are 
not normally subject to licensing.”303 The court also touched upon the 
lack of a continuing payment obligation, but found the transferees’ 
“ability [to] indefinitely possess the . . . CDs” to be determinative of the 
property right transferred.304 
Perpetual possession was also important to the court in Ver or v. 
Autodesk, Inc.,305 another case in which the court reclassified a software 
license as a sale.306 Recognizing that there is no bright-line test for 
distinguishing a license from a sale, the court held that if the transferee 
received perpetual possession of the software in exchange for a one-
time payment, then the software is sold, not licensed.307  
Closest to recognizing that a software transaction involves several 
distinct property interests in the software asset was the court in Softman 
Products Co., LLC. v. Adobe Systems, Inc.,308 a case in which a software 
distributor sold copies of unbundled Adobe software, in contravention 
of the Adobe license.309 Adobe framed the question as one about the 
ownership of intellectual property.310 The court rejected that 
characterization, instead describing the dispute as one “about the 
ownership of individual pieces of Adobe software.”311 The court further 
recognized that the Copyright Act distinguishes between the “tangible 
property rights in copies of the work and intangible property rights in 
the creation itself.”312 The software at issue in Softman, like the 
software at issue in the other reclassification cases, was delivered on a 
tangible disk, which made it easy for the court to emphasize the 
importance of possession.313 
In another case involving Adobe, however, the court also recognized 
that there is a difference between ownership of the intellectual property 
and ownership of the copy of the software but held nevertheless that the 
license agreement granted license rights rather than ownership rights.314 
                                                                                                                     
 302. Id. at 1061. 
 303. Id. at 1062. 
 304. Id. at 1061. 
 305. 555 F. Supp. 2d 1164 (W.D. Wash. 2008). 
 306. Id. at 1170. 
 307. Id. 
 308. 171 F. Supp. 2d 1075 (C.D. Cal. 2001). 
 309. Id. at 1080. 
 310. Id. at 1084. 
 311. Id. 
 312. Id. at 1084–85. 
 313. Id. at 1085–86. 
 314. Adobe Sys., Inc. v. Stargate Software, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1058 (N.D. Cal. 
2002). 
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In that case, the court placed an unfortunate amount of emphasis on the 
distinction between tangible and intangible assets, stressing that the 
value of the CDs at issue was attributable to the intangible code 
inscribed on it.315 Because the court recognized, correctly, that the CD 
would be worthless without the intellectual property, it upheld the 
license as a license.316 The court in Adobe Systems, Inc. v. Stargate 
Software, Inc. emphasized the difference between software and other 
assets, focusing on the ease of inexpensive copying.317  
All of the software reclassification cases illustrate why an 
understanding of virtual world assets can help us apply a numerus 
clausus analysis to agreements that transfer intangible assets. Most of 
these cases focus on possession, which is an important property 
attribute. Estates are defined in terms of the possessory rights that they 
convey, so determination of the existence and duration of possession is 
crucial to identification of the property rights granted in a conveyance. 
To most people today, “possession” means manual possession or 
occupation of tangible assets; understanding virtual world property 
helps us appreciate that rights similar to possessory rights can exist with 
respect to intangible assets.  
VI.   CONCLUSION 
One of the justifications for a closed set of property rights is that 
such a set gives notice to rights holders of the extent of their rights. 
Without such notice, people might not use their rights efficiently.318 On 
the one hand, many might not care whether sex beds, virtual money, or 
virtual land are used “efficiently”; these are still viewed by many as the 
playthings of people with too much time on their hands. But when we 
use these virtual playthings as a vehicle through which to explore rights 
in intangible assets generally, we can appreciate why concepts like the 
numerus clausus hould be more strictly applied to rights in emerging 
electronic assets. 
If rights in tangible assets are not infinitely customizable, then there 
is no reason that rights in intangible assets should exist in an unlimited 
number of forms. Given the notice function of standardized forms, there 
are probably more reasons to standardize rights in intangible assets than 
in tangible ones. Many contracts convey rights in intangible assets that 
are equivalent to the rights that exist in tangible assets. Specifically, as 
                                                                                                                     
 315. Id. at 1058–59. 
 316. Id. at 1059. 
 317. Id.  
 318. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 163, at S382 (“If two persons are both to have 
rights in a single asset, they need some means of assuring that they share a common 
understanding of those rights. Absent such understanding, the parties may mistakenly make 
inconsistent uses of the asset or underuse the asset.”). 
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with tangible assests, a holder of an intangible asset can often exclude 
others from the use of that asset. It is not always easy to appreciate this 
when the asset is invisible, but when the asset is visibly represented in a 
virtual world and can function like tangible property, we can understand 
that possession is not limited to tangible things.  
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